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ABSTRACT 
 
The growing market of mobile devices forces to question about how to protect users’ creden-
tials and data stored on such devices. Authentication mechanisms remain the first layer of security in 
the use of mobile devices. However, several of such mechanisms that have been already proposed 
were designed in a machine point of view. As a matter of fact, they are not compatible with behaviors 
human have while using their mobile devices in the daily life. Consequently, users adopted unsafe 
habits that may compromise the proper functioning of authentication mechanisms according to the 
safety aspect. 
The first main objective of this research project is to highlight strengths and weaknesses of 
current authentication systems, from the simpler ones such as PIN (Personal Identification Number) 
to the more complex biometric systems such as fingerprint. Then, this thesis offers an exhaustive 
evaluation of existing schemes. For this evaluation, we rely on some existing criteria and we also 
propose some new ones. Suggested criteria are chiefly centered on the usability of these authentica-
tion systems. 
Secondly, this thesis presents a practical implementation of a text-independent speaker au-
thentication system for mobile devices. We place a special attention in the choice of algorithms with 
low-computational costs since we want that the system operates without any network communication. 
Indeed, the enrollment, as well as the identification process are achieved onto the device itself. To 
this end, our choice was based on the extraction of Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients (LPCCs) 
(Furui 1981; O'Shaughnessy 1988) to obtain relevant voice features and the Naïve Bayes classifier 
(Zhang 2004) to predict at which speaker a given utterance corresponds. Furthermore, the authenti-
cation decision was enhanced in order to overcome misidentification. In that sense, we introduced the 
notion of access privileges (i.e. public, protected, private) that the user has to attribute to each appli-
cation installed on his/her mobile device. Then, the safest authority is granted through the result of 
the speaker identification decision as well as the analysis of the user’s location and the presence of a 
headset. 
In order to evaluate the proposed authentication system, eleven participants were involved in 
the experiment, which was conducted in two different environments (i.e. quiet and noisy). Moreover, 
we also employed public speech corpuses to compare this implementation to existing methods. Re-
sults obtained have shown that our system is a relevant, accurate and efficient solution to authenticate 
users on their mobile devices. Considering acceptability issues which were pointed out by some users, 
we suggest that the proposed authentication system should be either employed as part of a multilayer 
authentication, or as a fallback mechanism, to cover most of the user needs and usages. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
 
La croissance du marché des dispositifs mobiles implique de se questionner au sujet de com-
ment protéger l’identité ainsi que les données personnelles des utilisateurs qui sont stockées sur ces 
appareils. En ce sens, les mécanismes d’authentification demeurent la première couche de sécurité 
dans l’utilisation des mobiles. Cependant, il apparaît que la plupart des mécanismes d’authentification 
qui ont été proposés, ont été conçus suivant un point de vue orienté machine plutôt qu’humain. En 
effet, ceux-ci ne s’adaptent généralement pas avec l’usage quotidien qu’ont les utilisateurs lorsqu’ils 
se servent leur téléphone. En conséquence, ils ont adopté des habitudes dangereuses qui peuvent com-
promettre le bon fonctionnement des systèmes d’authentification. Celles-ci peuvent alors remettre en 
question la sécurité de leur identité ainsi que la confidentialité de leur contenu numérique. 
Le premier objectif principal de ce projet de recherche est de faire ressortir les forces et les 
faiblesses des méthodes d’authentification qui existent actuellement, des plus simples comme le NIP 
(Numéro d’Identification Personnel) aux solutions biométriques plus complexes comme l’empreinte 
digitale. Par la suite, ce mémoire offre une évaluation exhaustive de ces solutions, basée sur des cri-
tères existant ainsi que de nouveaux critères que nous suggérons. Ces derniers sont majoritairement 
centrés sur l’utilisabilité des mécanismes d’authentification qui ont été examinés. 
Dans un second temps, ce mémoire présente une implémentation pratique, pour périphériques 
mobiles, d’un système d’authentification d’orateur indépendant de ce qui est prononcé par l’utilisa-
teur. Pour concevoir un tel système, nous avons porté une attention particulière dans le choix d’algo-
rithmes admettant un faible temps d’exécution afin de se prémunir des communications réseau. En 
effet, ceci nous permet alors de réaliser le processus d’entraînement ainsi que la reconnaissance, di-
rectement sur le mobile. Les choix technologiques se sont arrêtés sur l’extraction de coefficients spec-
traux (Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients) (Furui 1981; O'Shaughnessy 1988) afin d’obtenir des 
caractéristiques vocales pertinentes, ainsi que sur une classification naïve bayésienne (Zhang 2004) 
pour prédire à quel utilisateur correspond un énoncé donné. La décision finale, quant à elle, a été 
améliorée afin de se prémunir des mauvaises identifications. En ce sens, nous avons introduit la notion 
de droits d’accès spécifiques (i.e. publique, protégé ou privé) que l’utilisateur doit attribuer à chacune 
des applications installées sur son mobile. Ensuite, l’autorisation d’accès la plus adaptée est accordée, 
grâce au résultat retournée par l’identification de l’orateur, ainsi que par l’analyse de la localisation 
de l’utilisateur et de l’emploi d’un micro-casque. 
Pour réaliser l’évaluation du système que nous proposons ici, onze participants ont été recru-
tés pour la phase d’expérimentation. Cette dernière a été menée dans deux types d’environnements 
différents (i.e. silencieux et bruyant). De plus, nous avons aussi exploité des corpus de voix publiques 
afin de comparer notre implémentation à celles qui ont été proposées par le passé. Par conséquent, 
les résultats que nous avons obtenus ont montré que notre système constitue une solution pertinente, 
précise et efficace pour authentifier les utilisateurs sur leurs périphériques mobiles. Compte tenu des 
problèmes d’acceptabilité qui ont été mis en avant par certains testeurs, nous suggérons qu’un tel 
système puisse être utilisé comme faisant part d’une authentification à plusieurs facteurs, mais aussi 
comme une solution de repli, en cas d’échec du mécanisme principal, afin de couvrir la majorité des 
besoins et des usages des utilisateurs. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
From the past decade, the market of mobile devices grew up exponentially. The 
Gartner Institute noticed that smartphone sales were over 400 thousand units in the 
second semester of 2014 (Laurence Goasduff 2015). These devices take a significant 
place in people’s everyday life. Indeed, people, and more specifically young ones have 
their mobile devices everywhere and at any time (Wilska 2003). They consider their 
mobiles as an important part of their life (Goggin 2012). Moreover, according to data 
from the Nielsen Company, users spent more than 30 hours using applications on such 
devices in the fourth quarter of 2013 (Nielsen 2014). Besides, it should be noted that a 
major player of the mobile device industry used to claim that there is an application for 
everything. 
Technical advancements in mobile devices led to significant evolution on the 
way people communicate and exchange pieces of knowledge. As a result, users do store 
private data such as pictures, videos, as well as secret information about their personal 
accounts (i.e. emails, social networks, bank accounts) on their devices. These personal 
contents may be considered as individuals’ digital identity. However, they are, most of 
the time, not adequately wary about the safety of information they save on their mobiles 
(Falaki et al. 2010). 
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Recently, major information technology companies such as Apple, Google, Mi-
crosoft and Yahoo have concentrated efforts in offering concrete novel authentication 
mechanisms to improve the safety of private contents stored on mobile devices. Indeed, 
both Apple and Google have suggested a fingerprint solution (i.e. Touch ID and Nexus 
Imprint respectively) to make their digital wallet platforms more secure (i.e. Apple Pay 
and Android Pay respectively). Moreover, Google has also provided, for a few years, 
several other context-aware and biometric schemes under the Smart Lock feature to 
secure mobiles’ access. In the same way, Microsoft aims at improving the security of 
every device running the latest major release of their operating system (i.e. Windows 
10) since they have announced the Windows Hello feature. This feature will allow users 
to unlock their devices either with their face, iris, or fingerprint. Finally, Yahoo also 
get involved in biometrics, since they have introduced an under-researched biometric 
authentication system which allows users to perform the authentication both with their 
ear and the geometry of their phalanges. 
Although latest advances in such a field of research offers more accurate and 
more reliable authentication solutions, such methods do not take into account several 
issues induced by users which involve several security threats. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Authentication may be defined as the process of an entity that has to become 
sure of the identity of another one (Lowe 1997). Such a process remains a crucial con-
cern with respect to modern computer systems and more specifically within a mobile 
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device context. However, proposed authentication mechanisms concede several well-
known drawbacks principally led by people’s usage and behavior. 
Whenever we are facing a machine that has to deal with human users, therefore, 
we have an interactive system (Benyon et al. 2005). As pointed out by the authors, a 
fundamental challenge with interactive systems is that human beings and machines 
have different characteristics. Indeed, what may be seen as strengths from a machine’s 
point of view, may also be a weakness for human being. On the one hand, machines 
can see humans as being vague, disorganized and emotional while they are precise, 
orderly, unemotional and logical. On the other hand, humans may claim to be attentive, 
creative, flexible and resourceful while machines are dumb, rigid and unimaginative. 
Such differences suggest that the key challenge is first to understand the human rather 
than design an interactive system from the machine’s point of view. However, when 
considering authentication systems that have been proposed over the last three decades, 
it seems that they have been designed without any concern for the human. As an exam-
ple, it was reported that half of the population does not lock their phone at all since they 
estimate that entering a 4-digit-PIN code involves lots of trouble, every time the mobile 
device has to be unlocked (Ben-Asher et al. 2011). Moreover, it is known that users 
have trouble remembering all passwords they use nowadays (Yan 2004). Consequently, 
some people prefer to reuse the same password in multiple situations while others 
choose to write them down. In the same way, since biometric systems do exploit con-
fidential information about the user, their acceptance rate remains slow whereas their 
devices possess either software, or hardware requirements. It is clear that behaviors 
reported here may lead a huge impact on the security of mobile devices. Accordingly, 
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people’s authentication usage may generate serious threats for the security that a system 
initially provides. In fact, an effective mechanism may become a weak one because it 
is not used as recommended. 
Most of proposed authentication mechanisms were also designed in order to be 
employed with traditional desktop computers, where few of them require costly hard-
ware (e.g. retina or iris recognition). Moreover, these methods may involve several 
series of complex computation, so that, the first mobile devices that appear on the mar-
ket may not be powerful enough to run these costly processes. Although the continuous 
growth of mobiles’ capabilities with respect to embedded hardware, the need for effi-
cient and reliable authentication solutions on these devices appear to be vital. 
Accordingly, the first issue we point out in this research project is that proposed 
authentication schemes do not take into account most of users’ needs and behaviors 
with respect to his/her involvement in the authentication process. In addition, we iden-
tify the importance to provide accurate, effective and reliable solutions which are able 
to run on weakest mobile devices present in the market, without the need of an extra 
piece of hardware than the ones already embedded. 
1.3 THESIS CONTRIBUTION 
The main contribution of this thesis is to design a novel approach in the field of 
authentication mechanisms for mobile devices, which take into account problems ex-
pressed in the previous section (user friendliness and computational cost). 
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To this end, we first propose a detailed taxonomy of authentication mechanisms 
used on mobile devices, where both their strengths and their weaknesses are high-
lighted. Such a review conducted us to suggest an exhaustive evaluation based on the 
work of Jain et al. (2006a), as well as several criteria we introduce, chiefly focused on 
the usability of these mechanisms for the user. This evaluation allows us to position 
this research in order to design a system which responds to identified problems. 
Moreover, we present a practical authentication system implementation as-
sessed through a rigorous experiment. This experiment was conducted thanks to the 
participation of several trial users. Hence, thanks to the test results we obtained and 
several analyses such as computation performances, as well as participants’ opinion 
regarding broadly authentication mechanisms and their opinion concerning our system, 
we position the proposed system over existing ones.  
1.4 THESIS PROJECT ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five main chapters. This first chapter was an intro-
duction to the research project. In the first place, the context of the research was pre-
sented. Then, a summary of problems and issues raised by this area of research were 
highlighted. 
The second chapter provides an exhaustive review of current authentication sys-
tems used on mobile devices. First, this chapter offers a description of each mechanism 
classified in three main families: knowledge-based and token-based systems, as well as 
biometric solutions. We focus on offering practical examples and use case scenarios. 
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Moreover, both strengths and weaknesses for each scheme are highlighted. Given that, 
we suggest a detailed evaluation for each authentication family in order to state the 
future of authentication mechanisms and to guide the design step of the system we 
introduce. 
The third chapter first presents an overview of the state of the art in the field of 
voice-based authentication mechanisms and more precisely, text-independent speaker 
authentication systems. Then, the proposed system is detailed. A particular attention in 
technological choices was paid since we wanted to design a standalone solution for 
mobile devices to avoid a client/server architecture, which should be able to work 
properly on weakest mobile devices present in the market. 
The fourth chapter introduces the experiment we performed to collect data in 
order to assess the accuracy and the reliability of our system. Then, several evaluations 
are proposed for comparison purposes regarding classification performance on few 
other well-known data sets and computation performance. In addition, the last section 
of this chapter exposes the opinion collected from participants of the experiment. In 
that sense, the results obtained allow us to understand the viability of the proposed 
system as regards to users’ needs and behaviors. 
Finally, the fifth and last chapter draws a general conclusion for this research. 
Furthermore, the last part of this thesis ends with a personal assessment of such an 
experience as a first step into the world of scientific research. 
  
CHAPTER II 
AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS ON MOBILE DEVICES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, various authentication schemes have been proposed. 
Hence, we divided them into three broad categories: knowledge-based, token-based 
and biometrics (Li 2009). Figure 2.1 illustrates the authentication mechanisms that are 
currently employed with mobile devices. 
First of all, knowledge-based authentication schemes focus on what the user 
knows. Precisely, we differentiate implicit and explicit knowledge-based mechanisms. 
Explicit ones imply that the user has to retain new data like a 4-digit-PIN code or a 
password (Lamport 1981). Whereas, implicit knowledge-based mechanisms call upon 
cognitive functions of the user, to exploit the data they already know (Zviran and Haga 
1990). 
Secondly, token-based mechanisms need the user to prove they possess a phys-
ical token that often involves a two-factor authentication process (Jing et al. 2009). As 
an example, we can mention the smartcard that the user needs to own to authenticate 
himself or herself on his/her mobile phone. 
Finally, biometric mechanisms rely on the uniqueness of users’ physiological 
or behavioral trait to perform the authentication process. Consequently, we subdivide 
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biometrics into physiological and behavioral sets. Physiological biometrics exploit sin-
gularities of the human body like fingerprints (Jain et al. 1997) while behavioral ones 
require users to perform some actions to prove their identity such as gait (Gafurov et 
al. 2006). 
Mobile devices authentication 
mechanisms
Knowledge-based Token-based Biometrics
Text enhanced passwords
Graphical passwords
Implicit 
(cognitive)
Explicit BehavioralPhysiological
Haptic passwords
P.I.Ns
Smartcards
Smartwatches
Fingerprint
Face
Hand geometry
Ear shape
Voice
Gait
Keystroke dynamics
Signature
Heartbeat
 
 
FIGURE 2.1: TAXONOMY OF MOBILE DEVICES’ AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS 
The main contribution of this chapter is to emphasize, through a critical analy-
sis, most of the weaknesses of proposed authentication schemes, in real-life situations 
with a particular focus for implementation on a mobile device. We previously pointed 
out that users have adopted unsafe habits because of the non-user-centered design of 
most of the authentication process. Hence, our work aims at analyzing how proposed 
mechanisms whether suit or not characteristics of human users and why they are not 
entirely appropriate to their needs. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, it will review 
authentication schemes that have been proposed in a mobile device context, where, for 
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each of them, both strengths and weaknesses are highlighted. Then, we offer an evalu-
ation guided by criteria that were previously proposed by Jain et al. (2006a) in the field 
of authentication. In addition to, we will increase such an assessment with criteria we 
suggest that stem from our critical analysis. Finally, this evaluation conducts us to draw 
a conclusion and state about the aftermath of authentication mechanisms for mobile 
devices. 
2.2 KNOWLEDGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS 
Knowledge-based authentication mechanisms rely upon users’ ability to recall 
secret information. It is possible to distinguish two different kinds of knowledge-based 
techniques: explicit and implicit schemes. On the first hand, explicit ones need the user 
to set and learn a piece of knowledge. On the other hand, implicit ones exploit the user 
memory thanks to either, or both, personal information they already know, or about 
their everyday life preferences (e.g. music they like or food they enjoy). 
This section describes in detail both explicit and implicit techniques and ex-
poses that users’ capacity to remember a secret remains a common denominator in the 
weakness of each knowledge-based authentication scheme. 
2.2.1 STRENGTH EVALUATION OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES 
The strength of a knowledge-based authentication scheme is theoretically meas-
urable through the evaluation of the entropy of the password space. The entropy of a 
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password represents the measurement of how unpredictable a password is and the pass-
word space is the total number of distinct possibilities the authentication system can 
support. Hence, the evaluation of the entropy of the password space provides a metric 
of how strong an authentication system is. The size 𝑆 of the password space for a sys-
tem having 𝑁 possible entries is given by the equation (2.1). The length of the input to 
retain is expressed by 𝑘. Finally, the entropy 𝐻 can be computed by using the equation 
(2.2), and the result is expressed in bits. 
 
 
𝑆 = 𝑁𝑘. (2.1) 
 𝐻 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑆). (2.2) 
 
Real use cases reveal that such an evaluation still not represents an accurate 
measure of the strength of a knowledge-based authentication mechanism. Indeed, since 
users have the possibility to choose their own secret input, they often refer to a familiar 
pattern rather select it randomly. As an example, Yampolskiy (2006) has pointed out 
that 47.5% of the users chose a family-oriented information as secret input such as a 
child's name or date of birth. Therefore, a lower subset of the 𝑁 possibilities is truly 
used, since the length of passwords are generally less than 8 characters (Yan 2004). 
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2.2.2 EXPLICIT SCHEMES 
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) 
Example of use case scenario: commonly, users have to choose an array of 4-
digits that they will need to remember. Then, each time the mobile device has to be 
unlocked, the system prompts an input field where the user needs to fill these digits in 
the correct order to be authorized to access the whole content of the device. 
Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) are a simple way to restrain access to 
an entity due to their composition—from 4 to 16 digits. They appear with the growth 
of ATMs (Automated Teller Machines), and they are mostly used in the banking sys-
tem. Regarding a mobile device context, PINs currently remain the most dominant au-
thentication method to protect the access of these devices since they are employed by 
2/3 of the mobile device users (Clarke and Furnell 2005). PINs can be applied to both 
the device and the user’s Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)—a removable token that 
contains required cryptographic keys for network access. Both of the two leading mo-
bile device operating systems (i.e. Android and iOS) provide this authentication mech-
anism. 
However, PINs present several issues considering memorability or human hab-
its that may compromise the security offers by the system. In that sense, Clarke and 
Furnell (2005) have assessed that 1/3 of mobile devices users who keep their phone 
locked through a 4-digits PIN method, consider such protection as an inconvenience in 
everyday life. As a result, users do need to retain a code that has a familiar signification, 
such as their date of birth (Yampolskiy 2006). Furthermore, Clarke and Furnell (2005) 
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also enhance the weakness of this authentication scheme. Indeed, 36% of the respond-
ents have reported using the same PIN-code for multiple services. Thus, it becomes 
easier for an attacker to determine the correct 4-digits PIN in order to have free access 
to several other services where the code is employed. The lack of security brought by 
users can also be underlined through another study that reports that 26% of PIN users 
shared their own code with someone else (Clarke et al. 2002). 
While PINs still remain very popular, they may also be considered as the weak-
est authentication mechanism on the market as they offer a theoretically low entropy 
(i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(10
4)). Indeed, people adopted several behaviors to cope with the large cog-
nitive load that the system requires. All of this lead PIN authentication to be largely 
vulnerable to several attacks such as code guessing by social engineering, brute force, 
or shoulder surfing attacks (Hansman 2003; Orgill et al. 2004; Tari et al. 2006; Jagatic 
et al. 2007). Social engineering refers to the art of manipulating people to obtain from 
them few confidential piece of information to get hints about users’ PINs code that may 
be a date of birth. Shoulder surfing happens when a criminal is looking over the shoul-
der of a user while he/she is performing tasks on his/her mobile device such as unlock 
it with a PIN code. 
Text-enhanced passwords 
Example of use case scenario: conversely to PINs, users have to select, at least, 
an array of 6 characters that are not restricted to only digits. The whole set of charac-
ters offered by the keyboard of the mobile device is legitimate. Next, the authentication 
depends on the same process as the PIN one. 
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As opposed to PINs, text-enhanced passwords are more complex. Usually, they 
are composed of several different characters such as lower and upper case letters, digits, 
and also non-alphanumeric characters. At first, passwords were stored in plain text files 
without any encryption (Morris and Thompson 1979). Thereby, protect such sensitive 
information became crucial for numerical system. This mechanism is also provided by 
both Android and iOS platforms. However, as plainly regards authentication on mobile 
devices, text-enhanced passwords remain less popular than PINs among mobile device 
users. Indeed, authenticate users with a complex string of characters is an inherited 
process that comes from traditional computing and it was not revised at all before its 
arrival on mobile devices. 
The market of mobile applications is vast. As an example, the Apple Store 
counted up to 600,000 applications, and the total number of downloads surpassed 25 
billion in the year 2012 (Cuadrado and Dueñas 2012). Through this immense inventory, 
numerous applications require the user to login in order to have access to the entire set 
of features they offer (Sasse et al. 2001). Consequently, since text-enhanced passwords 
also take part in the daily usage of mobile devices as regards authentication; it is now 
important to illustrate the weakness of this mechanism for users’ memory and how such 
issues lead to affect mobile device security due to behaviors they adopt. Passwords 
remain theoretically a strong way to secure a system. However, they are usually long 
and sophisticated. Hence, much more memorizing abilities are required for the user. 
Indeed, Yan (2004) identifies that without the memorization problem, the maximally 
secured password would be blended with the maximum number of characters allowed 
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by the system, randomly arrange. This is possible to do for a machine, but almost im-
possible to retain for a human. Moreover, text-enhanced passwords do have better en-
tropy than PINs (i.e. 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(94
𝑘)) where 𝑘 is the password length and 94 is the number 
of printable characters excluding SPACE. Although, because they are everywhere, and 
because they were designed to a machine point of view, passwords represent a mecha-
nism not as good as claimed. Hence, a study conducted by Riley (2006) shows that 
more than half password users have conceded using the exact same string of characters 
for multiple accounts on numerical systems. Moreover, about 15% of them admit that 
they used to write down their list of passwords in case they forget them, while 1/3 also 
report using the remember my password function, to produce another password than 
the one they originally set up. The growth of the number of numerical services we use 
in our everyday life affects significantly the usage of passwords we have. Another study 
also highlights the deficiency of this mechanism as they released the “worst passwords” 
list, which exposed some examples such as “123456”, “password” or “qwerty” that 
are frequently set up by users (Slain January 19, 2015). Such examples formed perfect 
cases of vulnerability for the security of mobile devices. Just as PINs, text-enhanced 
passwords are strongly exposed to brute force, dictionary, social engineering, and 
shoulder surfing attacks (Hansman 2003; Orgill et al. 2004; Tari et al. 2006; Jagatic et 
al. 2007). 
Graphical passwords 
Example of use case scenario: with graphical passwords, users have to recall 
some pieces of visual information. There are a lot of various implementations, but the 
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most well-known is probably the one implemented in Android that appears in the ear-
liest version of the mobile operating system. First, the user has to set up a path between 
dots in a matrix, as shown by the gray stroke in Figure 2.2. To be granted to the full 
access of the mobile device, the user has to reproduce the path he/she initially set-up. 
The order of dots where the path is passing by is essential. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, 
if the user defined a path, from the lower-left-corner dot, to the upper-left-corner dot, 
the inverse drawing (from the upper corner, to the lower one) will not genuinely au-
thenticate the user. 
 
FIGURE 2.2: ANDROID IMPLEMENTATION OF GRAPHICAL PASSWORD 
Knowing that humans have better abilities for recognizing and recalling visual 
information when compared to verbal or textual information (Kirkpatrick 1894), other 
mechanisms were imagined to use a graphical scheme instead of a sequence of charac-
ters as passwords. Since the patent was introduced by Blonder (1996), multiple 
schemes have been designed. Biddle et al. (2012) have grouped these proposed systems 
into three broad categories: recall-based systems; recognition-based systems, and cued-
recall systems. 
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First of all, in a recall-based system, the first step is to choose a predefined 
pattern. Then, the user is presented with a selected image or a blank canvas, where the 
secret sketch has to be reproduced each time he/she wants to authenticate himself or 
herself. Secondly, in a recognition-based system the user is invited to select a sequence 
of predefined images among several others. The number of presented images is gener-
ally limited to ensure the usability. Finally, in a cue-recall system the user has to recall 
and target a specific part of a picture. In this way, such systems reduce the memory 
load that the user needs with recall-based systems. Biddle et al. (2012) have pointed 
out that users are more comfortable to use a graphical password than a digit or a text-
based password every day. However, it is known that the Android implementation al-
lows 389,112 possibilities (Uellenbeck et al. 2013). Therefore, the password space is 
not superior to a 6-digit PIN. Moreover, as reported by Uellenbeck et al. (2013), users 
do not exploit the maximum potentiality of the security since some graphical schemes 
are evident to perform. Another relevant example of a graphical scheme may be the 
Picture Gesture Authentication (PGA) feature introduced by Microsoft in Windows 8 
(Sinofsky 2011). The idea behind this mechanism is to allow users to define some spe-
cific gestures (i.e. taps, circles and lines) over either pre-defined pictures, or users’ 
personal ones. The whole set of possibilities for such a system largely relies on both 
the number and the nature of gestures determined. According to Sinofsky (2011), when 
the user defines two of the most complex gestures (i.e. lines), there are 846,183 unique 
possibilities. 
As a matter of fact, as assessed by Biddle et al. (2012), it is possible to say that 
graphical passwords do not offer a higher level of security than PINs or text enhanced 
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passwords. Indeed, as regards an implementation such as the Android one, Uellenbeck 
et al. (2013) have experienced the ability to find the most common path defined, of 
numerous graphical schemes. They showed that it was possible to determine the right 
path statistically by applying a Hidden Markov Model technique on their data set. Con-
cerning gesture-based graphical authentication process, Zhao et al. (2015) have demon-
strated that the framework they built was able to guess a large portion of the picture 
passwords set of their study. Moreover, Aviv et al. (2010) showed that it was possible 
to find the graphical scheme through oily residues, or smudges that users leave on the 
touch-screen surface. They named this vulnerability “smudge attack”. Besides, graph-
ical passwords also have the same other vulnerabilities as all knowledge-based authen-
tication mechanisms: social engineering (Orgill et al. 2004; Jagatic et al. 2007) and 
shoulder surfing (Tari et al. 2006; Lashkari et al. 2009). Recently, Gugenheimer et al. 
(2015) have proposed a novel graphical authentication concept that claims to be robust 
against shoulder surfing. A grid of randomly generated numbers is prompt to the user 
and the real PIN code is hidden inside. Then, just as the android implementation, the 
user has to draw the path between each number of the PIN and at the same time, several 
other paths are painted on the grid. Through this approach, shoulder surfing attacks 
were reduced down to 10.5% and authors have pointed out that no participant forgot 
their graphical scheme. However, it is clear that their process involves a high level of 
memorization to recall the information due to its complexity when compared to a sim-
ple 4-digit PIN code. 
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Haptic passwords 
Example of use case scenario: instead of visual information, the user has to 
recall a sequence of kinesthetic phenomena produced by the mobile devices. The idea 
is to let the user define his/her own sequence that he/she has to reproduce afterwards 
to access the mobile device. 
With the emergence of modern mobile devices, the desire to exploit haptic in 
numerical systems, to enhance the user experience, was strong. Mobile devices such as 
smartphones are composed of a lot of new technologies like touch screens and sensors 
that provide many more possibilities regarding authentication mechanisms. Conse-
quently, several new knowledge-based authentication schemes have been designed re-
cently. As an example, Bianchi et al. (2010) suggested a novel approach through haptic 
passwords. The initial work of PINs is retained, but the user has to recall a sequence of 
vibrations scheme instead of a sequence of single digits. As graphic passwords, haptic 
ones were designed to be more convenient for users than text-enhanced passwords. The 
implementation proposed by Bianchi et al. (2012) attempt to avoid the memorability 
issues encountered by users and reduce behaviors that conduct to security vulnerabili-
ties. However, this study also highlights that such new authentication mechanisms, still 
require unreasonable calls from memory. As a result, they are not the answer to fix 
issues provided by PINs, text passwords, or graphical passwords. 
2.2.3 COGNITIVE SCHEMES 
Mechanisms we described above are all explicit methodologies for a 
knowledge-based authentication. However, each person has a unique knowledge. 
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Thereby, cognitive passwords aim at exploiting personal facts, opinion, and interests 
as a means of authentication. This process is defined as a challenge-response. 
The idea behind these schemes first stems from regular computer security ac-
cess where users, in addition to a conventional password, have to answer some personal 
questions to be granted access. However, regarding a mobile device context, such an 
approach should be more considered. Indeed, as we state in the first chapter of this 
thesis, users used to store more and more data on their devices. Thus, data such as 
pictures, music, and information from social media (Zviran and Haga 1990; Lazar et 
al. 2011) may be exploited to build a convenient cognitive process for authentication, 
revised to be employed with mobile devices. 
The experiment led by Bunnell et al. (1997) regarding these authentication 
schemes showed that personal facts were better recalled than others. Nevertheless, peo-
ple socially close to the user were easily able to guess many answers, that is why, Lazar 
et al. (2011) have proposed a method to personalize cognitive passwords to individual 
users. Results obtained show that personalization increases the recall of cognitive pass-
words, but does not help in improving their secrecy. 
2.3 TOKEN-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS 
Example of use case scenario: token-based authentication needs the user to 
possess a physical piece of hardware which has first to be coupled with the mobile 
device. Then, the mobile device has to verify credentials of the token to grant access to 
the user. 
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Token-based authentication mechanisms require a hardware interaction be-
tween the user and his/her device to complete the authentication process. Such mecha-
nisms involve at least a two-factor authentication (multi-factor is used when there are 
more than two) due to the commitment to attest that both the password is correct, and 
the user holds the token all along the authentication process. The three major types of 
tokens are USB token devices, smart cards and passwords that are randomly generated 
(Council 2005). Such random passwords are generated on a server and usually imply a 
mobile device in the authentication process, to receive such a secret Aloul et al. (2009), 
but the purpose is not to authenticate a user directly on his/her mobile device. 
Thereby, these old implementations—when compared to the existence of mo-
bile devices—are no longer applicable as they were initially designed. Nowadays, we 
observe the growth of smart objects and connected objects as known as the Internet of 
Things (IoT) (Miorandi et al. 2012). Consequently, modern approaches regarding to-
ken-based authentication mechanisms appear to be more convenient with the use of 
such devices. As examples, smart watches are replacing USB devices while NFC tags 
will supplant smart cards overtime, since it is possible to bring them everywhere (i.e. 
wallets, clothes). With the fifth version of Android, Google introduced a feature called 
“Trusted devices”. This feature aims at providing an automatic authentication mecha-
nism that uses smart objects the user has to couple to his/her mobile device. As a result, 
as long as the mobile device detects a connection with the token hardware through 
Bluetooth, NFC or Wi-Fi, it remains unlocked. 
Regarding two-factor authentication mechanisms, Schneier (2005) suggests 
that “they solve the security problem we had ten years ago, not security problems we 
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have today”. The use of smart objects over the authentication process implies many 
cases of vulnerability issues. Indeed, whenever someone wears a smart object as a to-
ken for the authentication process, the mobile device should not be sighted off. Due to 
the fact that there is no need to replay the authentication process, the mobile device 
becomes simply accessible by anyone nearby. Another problematic situation may be 
observed, where both devices are stolen by the same person. 
2.4 BIOMETRICS 
For many years, it is known that humans exhibit a various unique set of features. 
As an example, each human fingerprint describes a unique pattern; in the same way, 
blood vessels of the retina also have a unique pattern. Biometrics systems exploit these 
singularities in order to authenticate users. Hence, with a biometric system, there is no 
need for remembering or recalling any information; instead, the singularity of interest 
just has to be digitized and compared to the saved one. To this end, several biometric 
systems necessitate the use of a scanning or recording hardware that is not always 
adapted to suit with mobile devices. When compared to other approaches, a vast ma-
jority of biometric solutions have a greater cost of implementation. Moreover, due to 
the assessment of data that come directly from the user, biometrics raise some privacy 
concerns because of the uniqueness of each of us. As a result, even though these sys-
tems generally offer a high level of security and a sufficient accuracy, their usage re-
mains limited, particularly with mobile devices. 
The review of biometric authentication that we propose below does not heed 
sophisticated mechanisms such as blood vessels, retina or iris pattern recognitions that 
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are way too complex in hardware requirements or computational costs, to be applied 
on mobile devices, presently. Retina-based systems are currently only used in highly 
classified government and military facilities (Nanavati et al. 2002). Moreover, iris pat-
tern recognition requires specific infrared hardware to authenticate users accurately 
(Wildes 1997; Daugman 2004; Jain et al. 2006a). Hence, we focus on offered mecha-
nisms for mobile devices and the ones that may be materialized in coming years. 
2.4.1 FINGERPRINT 
Example of use case scenario: first, the user has to let her/his device knows the 
pattern of one or more of his/her fingerprints. To this end, each finger the user wants 
to use has to be put, several times, on the sensor to digitalize the fingerprint. Then, 
each time an authentication is required, the user places any previously recorded finger 
on the sensor to unlock the device. 
This technology exploits unique fingerprint patterns that are present in every 
human’s fingers to authenticate users. Ridges that compose the pattern are traditionally 
classified into loops, arches and whorls motifs. Figure 2.3 illustrates three examples of 
these patterns. 
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A)  B)  C) 
FIGURE 2.3: THE THREE RIDGES PATTERN OF THE FINGERPRINT WHERE A) ARCH 
PATTERN; B) LOOP PATTERN AND C) WHORL PATTERN (SOURCE: FINGERPRINT. 2016, 
AUGUST 7. IN WIKIPEDIA) 
Fingerprint techniques were used for decades using ink to print the pattern onto 
a piece of paper (Berry and Stoney 2001). However, several sensors were designed to 
perform the acquisition such as optical scanning, capacitive scanning, and ultra-sound 
scanning (Jain et al. 1997; Kroeker 2002; Jain et al. 2006b). Due to the maturity and 
the flexibility of fingerprint systems it is now the most popular biometric system on 
mobile devices on the market. Indeed, fingerprint authentication deliver a high accu-
racy level and may be used in a wide range of environments. Moreover, with the growth 
of micro-technology and the emergence of mobile devices more and more efficient, 
fingerprint systems were integrated into these devices as means of authentication. The 
most well-known example of fingerprints used with mobile devices is the Apple Touch 
ID technology that comes from the patent of Bond et al. (2012). This major player of 
the mobile device industry builds an extra capacitive sensor in all their latest 
smartphones that scans sub-epidermal skin layers. Furthermore, they made the acqui-
sition of the fingerprint possible up to 360-degrees of orientation that provide a very 
high level of accuracy and a small error rate. Moreover, several other phone and tablet 
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manufacturers also introduced fingerprint sensors built-in their phones. The major dif-
ference between each one resides in the location of the sensor to ensure the ease of use 
for end-users (i.e. inside the power button, at the back of the phone). 
In addition, Clarke et al. (2002) assessed that 74% of mobile device users pos-
itively accept fingerprint biometric as means of authentication. However, this mecha-
nism has weaknesses that engender threats in its usage. It has been discovered that 
“most devices are unable to enroll some small percentage of users” (Nanavati et al. 
2002). The accuracy of fingerprint scanning may decrease to null when digits are either 
too wet, or too dry and also too oily. That is the “moisture effect”. Fingerprints also 
tend to deteriorate over the time because of age, wear or tear (Nanavati et al. 2002). 
Furthermore, fingerprint authentication schemes suffer from confidentiality threats, as 
well as spoofing attacks that question the security they attempt to provide. Indeed, on 
the one hand, users may be scanned without their consent. On the other hand, 
Matsumoto et al. (2002) proved that artificial fingers either made of silicon or gelatin, 
were accepted by 11 fingerprint systems during the enrollment procedure. 
2.4.2 FACE RECOGNITION 
Example of use case scenario: as well as fingerprint authentication process, the 
user has to let the device capture his/her facial characteristics. To this end, he has to 
stand in front of the camera of the device while the system is processing the learning 
of his/her face. Then, if the face is recognized by the system, the user is allowed to 
access the device. 
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Face recognition is the most natural means of biometric authentication because 
humans also perform this evaluation in their everyday interactions. This authentication 
scheme may also be plainly integrated into an environment that allows image acquisi-
tion such as mobile devices, where a large majority of them have a frontal camera. 
Moreover, methods to acquire an image of the face are assessed as non-intrusive (Jain 
et al. 2006a). Most of the time, facial recognition systems rely on the analysis of facial 
features such as the position of eyes, nose and mouth and distances between these fea-
tures (Dabbah et al. 2007). The evolution of both hardware and software led facial 
recognition to become faster and to provide a better level of accuracy than before. Be-
sides, it should be noted that a facial recognition may be continuously achieved. Indeed, 
the user may perform the authentication by his/her face, and then, the system may au-
tomatically verify that it is always the same face that the device is using when it is not 
in sleep mode. 
From a few years, Google has offered a face-based authentication system. Alt-
hough it was not genuinely successful, improvements that were made in the new ver-
sion of the operating system still not accurately identifies the user in numerous cases 
such as low lighting environments. As a matter of fact, Adini et al. (1997) have pointed 
out this problem as a major drawback in facial recognition, as well as a high complexity 
in the background. In addition, physical changes, such as hairstyle or beard variations, 
and wearing hats or glasses (Martínez 2002), may greatly affect the matching rate of 
face recognition systems. Such systems also have troubles to identify very similar in-
dividuals such as twins (Grother et al. 2010) and to keep a satisfying level of accuracy 
when physical changes occur owing to the age (Lanitis et al. 2002). Finally, the fact 
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that a user may be scanned without his/her consent raises serious threats according to 
confidentiality. 
2.4.3 HAND GEOMETRY AND EAR SHAPE 
Example of use case scenario: as every biometric system, both hand and ear 
recognition need to learn from user unique physical features. Depending on the imple-
mentation, this process may be performed, several times, through either optical analy-
sis, or through the capacitive touch-screen of the mobile device. Finally, the user has 
to repeat once the same process, each time the device has to be unlocked. 
Both hand geometry and ear shape biometric authentication mechanisms are 
based on the fact that nearly every individual’s hands and ears are shaped differently. 
These body parts also remain practically the same after a certain age. 
As regards ear shape as a means of authentication, Alphonse Bertillon’s re-
searches helped to develop such biometric systems as he worked particularly on the 
classification of this body part (Bertillon 1893). Several more recent studies on the 
subject have shown that the acquisition of the ear was exclusively made with cameras 
(Yuizono et al. 2002; Chen and Bhanu 2005; Choraś 2005). In that sense Descartes 
Biometric has released, short while ago, the most mature ear-shape-based authentica-
tion system of the market: Helix. This software exploits the proximity sensor of the 
front camera on the mobile device. The user needs to place the device from 6 to 12 
inches in front of his/her ear. Then, 30 images per second are recorded, processed and 
finally compared to the stored template. Moreover, the company offers the possibility 
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to configure the accuracy threshold at a higher level. However, the record of ear images 
with the front camera of the mobile device may be disturbing for users in their daily 
usage. In that sense, the Yahoo research department yet offers an experimental ap-
proach that handles capacitive sensors embedded in the screen of mobile devices, to 
record the topography of the ear. According to Holz et al. (2015), this system correctly 
identified users at 99.8 percent of the time with a false negative rate of 7.8%. This rate 
is based on a test that involved 12 participants. Such a system appears to deliver a more 
appropriate ease of use for users since it mimicking the act of calling. 
On another side, hand geometry recognition is the ability to compare dimen-
sions of fingers and the localization of joints, shape and size of the palm, and also 
phalanges disposition. However, hand geometry is not distinctive enough to accurately 
identify a large set of individuals. Therefore, such systems may not be used in an au-
thentication process, but rather in a verification process. Just as ear recognition, several 
studies involve a camera through the hand-record process (Ross et al. 1999; Sanchez-
Reillo et al. 2000; Kumar et al. 2003). By contrast, researches of Holz et al. (2015) 
also introduce a novel approach for hand geometry recognition solutions. This experi-
mental system allows the authentication of mobile device users in the same way as the 
ear recognition system. Both phalanges and palm identifications are possible with this 
system. Results achieved showed a matching rate of 99.5% with a false negative rate 
of 26.8% and the precision fall down to 86.1% when the false negative rate reached 
0.2%. 
Ear shape recognition and hand geometry appear to be an encouraging way in 
order to authenticate users on their mobile devices since they aim to be more usable for 
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such devices. Examples presented by Holz et al. (2015) expose very simple techniques, 
which are easy to use and which do not require any additional sensor than the ones 
already built-in the mobile device. Although these systems expose promising results, 
they also admit several drawbacks. As concern ear shape, when recorded with a cam-
era, hairs, hats or piercings may compromise the identification process. Regarding hand 
geometry, jewelry and arthritis will involve matching errors in both cases. 
2.4.4 VOICE: SPEAKER RECOGNITION 
Speaker recognition techniques are classified as a behavioral biometric since 
they focus on vocal characteristics produced by the speech and not on the speech only. 
These features depend on the dimension of the vocal tract, mouth, and nasal cavities, 
but also rely on voice pitch, speaking style, and language (Eriksson and Wretling 1997) 
as shown in Figure 2.4. 
 
FIGURE 2.4: ANATOMICAL DIAGRAM OF THE VOCAL FOLDS OR CORDS (SOURCE: VOCAL 
FOLDS. 2016, AUGUST 24. IN WIKIPEDIA) 
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There are two leading methods to process speaker recognition: text-dependent 
and text-independent (Doddington et al. 2000; Gold et al. 2011). Text-dependent 
recognition involves the user to pronounce a predefined passphrase. It is considered as 
a voice password and used both for the enrollment and the verification process. By 
contrast, text-independent systems are able to identify the user accurately, for any de-
livered word or locution. However, Boves and Den Os (1998) have identified a third 
type of speaker recognition technique that is a combination of the two others: the text-
prompted method, that randomly select a passphrase the user needs to pronounce each 
time the system is used. Speaker recognition is an inexpensive solution to authenticate 
users on their mobile devices since no additional sensor is required. In addition, speaker 
recognition is another mechanism that may be able to authenticate users continuously. 
Indeed, a first recognition may be achieved to grant the access to the owner, but such 
a process may also be performed each time the device either, or both, receive or emit a 
phone call. As an example of practical implementations, Google also introduces in 
“Smart-Lock”, the “Trusted voice” feature. As all text-dependent-based speaker recog-
nition, the user has to enroll his/her voice by pronouncing “Ok Google” three times. 
Then, this passphrase must be repeated each time the mobile device needs to be ac-
cessed. Whenever the record both matches the voice model and the passphrase, the 
access to the mobile device is granted. 
However, speaker-recognition-based authentication mechanisms admit several 
major drawbacks. In the first place, since such systems are viewed as behavioral, the 
current physical, medical or emotional condition of the user may considerably affect 
the accuracy. Voice is also likely to change over time due to the age. Moreover, speaker 
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recognition techniques are rarely noise resistant. Then, various loud background noises 
make such systems almost impossible to use in public places such as bars or public 
transports. Finally, speaker recognition techniques are singularly exposed to security 
threats. It is possible for an attacker to record or imitate the voiceprint of the user to 
perform a fraudulent authentication afterwards (Lau et al. 2004). 
In this section, we provided an overview of voice-based authentication mecha-
nisms in order to review the entire set of authentication techniques. However, a more 
specific related work will be presented in the next chapter since this thesis introduces 
a practical application of a speaker authentication system for mobile devices. 
2.4.5 GAIT 
Example of use case scenario: the process of authentication through gait anal-
ysis is independent of any action from the user. The mobile device is able to determine 
whether he/she is walking or not and then perform a recognition to unlock the device 
automatically in a continuous manner. 
Gait recognition is a technology based on the analysis of the “rhythmic patterns 
associated with walking stride” (Rani and Arumugam 2010). The observation that each 
human’s walking style is different leads to the development of advanced biometric au-
thentication systems that exploit such behavioral characteristics. 
Accordingly, studies have proposed a gait analysis mechanism based on an ac-
celerometer to collect features which create the gait template (Gafurov et al. 2006; 
Derawi et al. 2010). It is possible for such a system to be integrated with mobile devices 
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since they include built-in inertial sensors (i.e. accelerometer, gyroscope). As a matter 
of fact, gait recognition may become a convenient way to authenticate users as they 
always keep their mobile devices within their pocket or a bag. It is fair to say that it 
constitutes a human-centered system since the authentication process is wholly imper-
ceptible to the user. 
Withal, gait is not as stable over time due to changes in body weight. Such a 
physical change is not the only way for this human behavior to change. Indeed, brain 
damages, injury and also inebriety may involve from a short time to a long time or 
permanent variation in the manner of how individuals walk (Boyd 2004; Sarkar et al. 
2005). 
2.4.6 KEYSTROKES DYNAMICS 
Keystroke dynamics are based on the measurement and the assessment of the 
human’s typing rhythm on numerical systems. This process allows the creation of a 
digital print upon users’ interaction with devices that are rich in cognitive qualities 
(Obaidat 1995). Characteristics of this user behavior are fairly unique to each person 
and hold a high potential as an authentication mechanism. With the growth of capaci-
tive touch screens, keystrokes patterns are now capable of providing even more unique 
features for the authentication than only typing rhythm, which includes key press du-
ration, latencies, typing rate, and typing pressure. Such characteristics may be meas-
ured up to milliseconds order precision (Senk and Dotzler 2011) and more recent stud-
ies have pointed out high accuracy level (Trojahn et al. 2013; Deng and Zhong 2015). 
Thus, it is nearly impossible for an attacker to replicate a defined keystroke pattern 
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without an enormous amount of effort. The main benefit of keystroke dynamics pattern 
recognition is that anything except an extra software layer is required.  Moreover, key-
strokes analysis may be employed as continuous authentication process for free typing 
instead of one-time authentication such as fingerprint. However, since touch keyboards 
only appear when users are granted the full access, it is not possible to perform the 
authentication process beforehand. As a result, keystroke dynamics may only be em-
ployed to verify continuously that the current user is truly the owner of the mobile 
device afterwards. Thus, such a system must not be self-sufficient and requires to be 
coupled to a non-continuous authentication scheme as regards a mobile device usage. 
2.4.7 SIGNATURE 
Example of use case scenario: generally, a blank canvas is prompted to the user 
where he/she has to make his/her personal signature. The analysis is based on the way 
the signature is produced by exploiting pressure, direction, acceleration; rather than 
only a comparison of the signature pattern itself. The first step resides in the definition 
of such a model to compare with, and then, the user has to reproduce the signature 
each time the mobile device has to be accessed. 
Signatures were used for decades in the concrete world while people need to 
enact documents. The same idea is used over numerical systems for authentication pur-
poses. Signature recognition is considered as a behavioral biometric since it is based 
on the dynamic of making signature rather than a unique comparison of the signature 
itself. 
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Since users have to reproduce their signature on a mobile device touch screen, 
the identification process may determine dynamics, owing the measurement of the 
pressure, the direction, the velocity and the acceleration and the length of the strokes. 
Initially, the hardware used to record individual’s signatures was not convenient 
enough for users (Nalwa 1997). However, with the advent of capacitive touch screens 
on mobile devices, the use of such an authentication process became user-friendlier. 
Moreover, a unique extra software layer is required to make it work. 
In spite of this, as for every behavioral biometric system, people’s physical and 
emotional condition may considerably affect an authentication mechanism based on 
signature recognition. Besides, it is important to note that this is the only biometric 
authentication scheme that is possible to be deliberately changed by the user. Moreo-
ver, any replication in the way of proceeding the signature requires lots of effort. 
2.4.8 HEARTBEAT 
Recently, Sufi et al. (2010) have introduced the use of the electrical activity of 
the heart as a novel biometric authentication mechanism. Since the heartbeat is evalu-
ated as unique for each person (Khan 2008), such a system requires a record of an 
electrocardiogram (ECG or EKG) as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Hence, as with other 
biometric authentication schemes we described above, the first step of the process con-
sists in an enrollment phase. Unique features are extracted to build a template, then 
compared through the identification process. 
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FIGURE 2.5: EXAMPLE OF AN ECG CURVE (SOURCE: ELECTROCARDIOGRAPHY. 2016, JUNE 
22. IN WIKIPEDIA) 
Exploiting ECG as means of authentication is suitable across a wide range of 
people. Indeed, heartbeat samples may be collected from any part of the body such as 
fingers, toes, chest, and wrist. Thus, people who suffer from large injuries may be au-
thenticated, continuously or not, by using such a system. As we saw before, connected 
objects and in a broader sense, IoT, begin to take a measurable place through the nu-
merical environment (Miorandi et al. 2012). In that sense, a Canadian company pa-
tented a wristband that is fully compliant with mobile devices through a companion 
application. This band is able to authenticate a user wearing it by his/her heart signature 
(Fatemian et al. 2010). 
Such a system seems to be largely reliable as reproducing heartbeat signature 
depends upon sophisticated skills and hardware. Therefore, it is nearly impossible for 
an attacker to spoof such authentication systems. Since it may be considered as a be-
havioral biometric, several factors may seriously affect its accuracy such as daily ac-
tivities and nutrition facts, stress level, and weariness. 
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2.4.9 BIOMETRICS PERFORMANCE 
As we have seen in above sections, biometric systems are not devoid of poten-
tial errors over the authentication process. These systems can make two types of errors: 
False Acceptance Rate (FAR), and False Rejection Rate (FRR). Figure 2.6 graphically 
illustrates these types of errors in detail. On the one hand, FAR or also False Match 
Rate (FMR) is the probability that the system incorrectly declares a successful match 
between the input pattern, and the ones stored in the database. FAR is obtained by the 
equation (2.3) where 𝐹𝑎 is the number of false acceptances, and 𝑉𝑖 is the number of 
imposter verifications. 
 
 𝐹𝐴𝑅 =  
𝐹𝑎
𝑉𝑖
. (2.3) 
 
On the other hand, FRR or also False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) is the proba-
bility that the system declares a failure while the input pattern matches with stored 
templates. FRR is obtained by the equation (2.4) where 𝐹𝑟 is the number of false rejec-
tions, and 𝑉𝑔 is the number of genuine verifications. 
 
 𝐹𝑅𝑅 =  
𝐹𝑟
𝑉𝑔
. (2.4) 
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Generally, the matching algorithm performs a decision using some parameters 
as a threshold. Graphically expressed both FAR, and FRR, by opposition to the given 
threshold, represent the Relative Operating Characteristic (ROC). This plot allows 
finding the Equal Error Rate (EER) as shown in Figure 2.6. EER is the rate at which 
both accept and reject errors are equal. This rate is commonly used to evaluate biomet-
rics. Indeed, the lower the EER is, the more accurate the system is considered to be. 
The report by Mansfield and Wayman (2002) describes in detail the performance eval-
uation for biometric systems. 
 
FIGURE 2.6: BIOMETRIC SYSTEM ERROR RATES, WHERE CURVES SHOW FALSE 
ACCEPTANCE RATE (FAR) AND FALSE REJECTION RATE (FRR) FOR A GIVEN THRESHOLD 
Table 2.1 exposes the performance of various biometric authentication mecha-
nisms which stem from several studies (Phillips et al. 2000; Jain et al. 2004; Jain et al. 
2005), according to metrics we described above. 
  
37 
TABLE 2.1: EVALUATION OF VARIOUS BIOMETRICS PERFORMANCES 
 EER FAR FRR CONDITIONS 
FACE RECOGNITION - 1% 10% Varied light: indoor, outdoor. 
FINGERPRINT 2% 0.1% 2% 
Rotation and exaggerated skin  
distortion. 
HAND GEOMETRY 1% 0.14% 2% With rings and improper placement. 
IRIS 0.01% ≈ 0% 0.99% Indoor. 
VOICE RECOGNITION 6% 3% 10% Text dependent and multilingual. 
KEYSTROKES 1.8% 7% 0.1% Data record during 6 months. 
 
The required accuracy of biometric systems depends chiefly on the need of the 
application. Presently, biometric system designers aim at reducing false acceptance 
rates. However, the false rejection rates undeniably grow. To cover FRR up, most of 
current designs offer to bypass the biometric system that fails and suggest the user to 
perform another authentication scheme instead. The use of such a fallback mechanism 
represents a multi-factor authentication scheme. Biometric was often introduced as an 
encouraging way to end with the use of passwords (i.e. knowledge-based schemes). 
However, since both Apple and Google recently released their respective biometric 
technologies “Touch ID”, “Nexus Imprint” and “Smart-Lock”, mobile device users still 
have to set up a more traditional authentication mechanism such as PIN before enabling 
these features. As a matter of fact, we may affirm that passwords are still not dead 
contrary to everything said. Nevertheless, as claimed by Kokumai (2015), threats that 
can be thwarted by biometric authentication that operated together with rescue pass-
words, still remain less secure than just a knowledge-based authentication mechanism. 
Indeed, a two-factor authentication system must be treated as a conjunctive statement 
in opposition to a disjunctive statement. In other words, both the main system and the 
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fallback one have to authenticate the user properly, and not just one, as offered by the 
main biometric solutions available on the market presently. 
2.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA AND DISCUSSION 
Based on the above critical analysis, it is possible to say that each authentication 
mechanism we assessed concede some advantages, as well as drawbacks. In order to 
state about the aftermath of authentication, this section will discuss the whole set of 
proposed mechanisms. 
First, we offer an examination of knowledge-based authentication schemes 
through both the theoretical and real measure of the password space entropy that each 
of them provides, as shown in Table 2.2. Theoretical entropy is inevitably greater than 
the real one since users do choose their own piece of knowledge. The main deficiency 
of PINs resides in their simplicity, as they remain easy to crack by a force brute attack. 
Moreover, users do prefer a significant code to them instead a random selection of 
numbers. Text-enhanced passwords are an excessively complex solution for mobile 
devices users that force them to choose easily-findable identification codes. Finally, 
graphical and haptic passwords provide an adequate level of security, but still remain 
easy to obtain through shoulder surfing attacks or smudge attacks. 
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TABLE 2.2: EVALUATION OF KNOWLEDGE-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS FOR 
MOBILE DEVICES VIA THE PASSWORD SPACE ENTROPY METRIC, WHERE H: HIGH, M: 
MEDIUM, L: LOW 
 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
 EXPLICIT 
 
PIN 
TEXT-ENHANCED  
PASSWORDS 
GRAPHICAL & 
HAPTIC  
PASSWORDS 
THEORETICAL 
PASSWORD-SPACE 
ENTROPY 
L H M 
REAL PASSWORD-SPACE 
ENTROPY 
L L M 
 
Secondly, we suggest an empirical evaluation of biometrics authentication 
mechanisms based on previous related work of Jain et al. (2006a). As assessed in the 
previous sections, several novel studies aim at improving biometric processes to be 
more accurate and fast, as regards mobile devices (Nickel et al. 2012; Belgacem et al. 
2015; Deng and Zhong 2015; Fathy et al. 2015). As a matter of fact, this study requires 
some improvement. Hence, changes we introduce mainly focus on the performance 
criteria. Moreover, we include heartbeat authentication that was not discussed in their 
work. Our evaluation is based on the same criteria suggested by Jain et al. (2006a) 
which were defined by biometric experts. Such a guideline is described as follows: 
1. Universality: Biometric solutions rely upon singularities of the human 
body or behavior, but the ability of such mechanisms to accurately iden-
tify the genuine user largely varies between each one. Consequently, 
Jain et al. (2006a) have suggested to quantitate the fact that each person 
should have the characteristic. 
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2. Uniqueness: Some physical traits of the human body (e.g. face) remain 
largely close in some cases (e.g. twins). Therefore, Jain et al. (2006a) 
have proposed to evaluate the probability that two individuals are po-
tentially the same, in terms of characteristics. 
3.  Permanence: Physical or behavioral features of the human used with 
biometrics may gradually evolve. This criterion figures out the invari-
ance of these characteristics with time (Jain et al. 2006a). 
4. Performance: The inability of a biometric system to identify a user with 
a 100% accuracy, lead to identifying the related performance offered by 
each one (Jain et al. 2006a). 
5. Collectability: Most of the time, the biometric authentication process 
involves additional hardware or a major computing complexity with 
mobile devices. This criterion refers to the evaluation of how simple a 
characteristic is quantitatively measurable (Jain et al. 2006a). 
6. Acceptability: Users may be hesitant to use some biometrics because of 
their association to certain use cases (i.e. forensics) or because of the 
hardware they require. Thus, it is important to state the users’ ac-
ceptance rate, according to such mechanisms (Jain et al. 2006a). 
7. Circumvention: The last criteria reported by Jain et al. (2006a) refers to 
the easiness of mimicking a singular trait or behavior with biometric 
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systems. Such an evaluation delivers the strength rate of biometric sys-
tems in front of fraudulent attacks (e.g. spoofing attack). 
The evaluation of biometric systems according to the previously proposed 
work, as well as improvement we suggest according to the evolution of these mecha-
nisms and the introduction of heartbeat as mean of authentication is provided by the 
Table 2.3. 
TABLE 2.3: EVALUATION OF BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS SUGGESTED BY 
JAIN ET AL. (2006A) REVISED THROUGH A PERSONNAL OPINION AND ADAPTED FOR MOBILE 
DEVICES USAGES, WHERE H: HIGH, M: MEDIUM, L: LOW. IMPROVEMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED 
IN BOLD-ITALIC 
 
BIOMETRICS 
 PHYSIOLOGICAL BEHAVIORAL 
 
 F
IN
G
E
R
P
R
IN
T
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A
C
E
  
R
E
C
O
G
N
IT
IO
N
 
 E
A
R
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A
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E
 
 H
A
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G
E
O
M
E
T
R
Y
 
 V
O
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E
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E
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N
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 G
A
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 R
E
C
O
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N
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N
 
 K
E
Y
S
T
R
O
K
E
  
D
Y
N
A
M
IC
S
 
 S
IG
N
A
T
U
R
E
 
 H
E
A
R
T
B
E
A
T
 
UNIVERSALITY M H M M M M L L M 
UNIQUENESS H L M M L L L L M 
PERMANENCE H M H M L L L L L 
COLLECTABILITY M H M H M H M H M 
PERFORMANCE H  M H H M  M M L M 
ACCEPTABILITY M H H M H H M H H 
CIRCUMVENTION H L M M L M M L H 
 
Finally, we estimate that several criteria were missing to perform a proper eval-
uation of authentication mechanisms. Consequently, we introduce four new criteria 
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based on the above critical analysis of these schemes we proposed. As a matter of fact, 
we define the following guideline: 
1. Confidentiality: Several authentication scheme designs such as fingerprint 
involve either, or both, record or store data that relate to the secrecy of the 
user. To ensure that the information the user provide remain in his/her pri-
vacy regards, is a crucial interest in the case of security threats. 
2. Intrusive: Several authentication mechanisms reviewed in this chapter in-
volve providing information or features relating to the user. This criterion 
focuses on the ethical concern of the data that use to be collected during the 
authentication process. This criterion mainly focuses on cognitive schemes, 
as well as biometric ones. Indeed, the authentication process requires to 
handle data that directly concern users, and that may be performed without 
their broad agreement. 
3. Ease of use: The major drawback of authentication mechanisms is predom-
inantly due to the way that Humans have to interact with these systems. In 
that sense, we suggest evaluating how the user is involved in the interaction 
process and how the system focuses on what people want to do rather than 
possibilities offered by the technology. In other words, with this criterion, 
we suggest evaluating how an inexperienced user is able to use an authen-
tication system without a lot of difficulty in a short period of time.   
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4. Usage frequency: Since most of more used authentication schemes also re-
main the weakest ones, we offer to identify to the popularity of the mecha-
nisms when applied to secure a mobile device. 
The evaluation of the whole set of authentication mechanisms as regards criteria 
we introduce in this section is provided by the Table 2.4. These values were mainly 
determined through a personal opinion.  
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TABLE 2.4: PERSONNAL ASSESSMENT OF THE WHOLE AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS FOR 
MOBILE DEVICES THROUGH THE CRITERIA WE SUGGEST, WHERE H: HIGH, M: MEDIUM, L: 
LOW 
   
C
O
N
F
ID
E
N
T
IA
L
IT
Y
 
IN
T
R
U
S
IV
E
 
E
A
S
E
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 U
S
E
 
U
S
A
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E
  
F
R
E
Q
U
E
N
C
Y
 
K
N
O
W
L
E
D
G
E
-B
A
S
E
D
 
E
X
P
L
IC
IT
 PINS L N/A M H 
TEXT-ENHANCED 
PASSWORDS 
L N/A L L 
GRAPHICAL & HAPTIC 
PASSWORDS 
M N/A M H 
IM
P
L
IC
IT
 
COGNITIVE-BASED  
PASSWORDS 
H M M L 
TOKEN-BASED H N/A M M 
B
IO
M
E
T
R
IC
S
 
P
H
Y
S
IO
L
O
G
IC
A
L
 
FINGERPRINT M M H M 
FACE RECOGNITION M H M M 
EAR SHAPE M M M L 
HAND GEOMETRY M M M L 
B
E
H
A
V
IO
R
A
L
 
VOICE RECOGNITION M L M M 
GAIT RECOGNITION L L H L 
KEYSTROKE DYNAMICS H L H M 
SIGNATURE M L M M 
HEARTBEAT L H H L 
 
Based on such a personal assessment, it is possible to observe that most of au-
thentication schemes raise some inconveniences for users since most of them are con-
sidered as not easy to use. Besides, proposed mechanisms that do not involve users in 
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the process of authentication, namely transparent for them such as gait recognition or 
keystroke dynamics, were identified as convenient. As a matter of facts, it is clear that 
the future trend for authentication on mobile devices will turn into systems that focus 
on the users first. As an example, it is known that people do spend a considerable 
amount of time in a few key locations such as home or work as assessed by Hayashi 
and Hong (2011). In that sense, ubiquitous mechanisms that will be able to learn about 
users’ habits and that will not require any passwords or tokens are close. Indeed, studies 
in that field of research expose promising results (Micallef et al. 2015), but efforts 
should probably pay more attention to such a key idea in coming years. 
Nowadays, authentication mechanisms remain an important field of interest for 
researchers and leaders of mobile device industry. According to major players on the 
market, it should be noted that both Apple and Microsoft took the biometric band re-
spectively, with the “Touch ID” technology and the launch of Windows 10 (Belfiore 
2015). Despite, Google seems to want to see further since their Advanced Technology 
and Projects (ATAP) division is currently working on an experimental multi-modal 
biometrics system based on behavioral analysis: the “Project Abacus”. The system will 
identify a genuine user through a “trust score” calculated through a real-time analyze 
of users’ voice recognition, keystroke dynamics and touch gestures, facial recognition, 
and location. The firm presented research results at its annual conference of 2015 and 
claimed that the entropy of such a system is now ten times higher than the most valuable 
fingerprint system of the market. While the project is still in development, Google aims 
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at integrating such a system into one of the next version of the Android mobile operat-
ing system. Hence, this research project simply confirms the trend in the evolution of 
authentication for a near future. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
The present review of mobile device authentication mechanisms leads us to af-
firm that each of the schemes we have reviewed concedes several strength and weak-
ness aspects. Since knowledge-based mechanisms were designed to a machine point of 
view, they first involve an enormous amount of memory efforts from users. Behaviors 
they consequently adopt to overcome a system they are not comfortable with, yield 
several threats and weaknesses as regards the security of their mobile devices. Token-
based authentication schemes are not devoid of weaknesses as well. However, with the 
advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), such mechanisms appear to be more convenient 
than knowledge-based systems and will certainly keep growing. Presently, biometric 
methods become more and more popular and easy to reach for everyone. Some remain 
just too much intrusive for users or lead them to believe that providing personal and 
unique features describing them is an important threat according to their privacy. Nev-
ertheless, biometric techniques are, overall, very accurate, but also accept certain dys-
functions. However, gathering a number of biometric mechanisms together, allow the 
entropy of the entire multi-factor system to extend and consequently, increase its accu-
racy. The major drawback of biometrics resides in the fallback mechanism designed to 
cope with false rejections and let a genuine user proceeds to his/her authentication 
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properly. Nevertheless, most of current biometric solutions for mobile devices availa-
ble on the market such as “Touch ID” or “Smart-Lock” have adopted this method. 
As we stated that the human factor is the fundamental drawback for authentica-
tion mechanisms since they involve lots of interaction with users; we consider that the 
aftermath of such systems should singularly take care of this criterion. Such mecha-
nisms already evolve to become no password systems. Although they currently provide 
a better convenience, they do not provide a better security. Based on such an evaluation, 
we assume that the optimal solution should be able to recognize a genuine user without 
the need for any interaction of his/her part. To be really accurate and secure, such a 
mechanism should be based on users’ habits of the everyday life (what does he/she do 
all along his/her day, in which order?) that involve collecting the most of possible rel-
evant patterns through the mobile device. However, it is important to consider that such 
a solution implies a large set of information, more than just for one user. The processing 
of all of this knowledge, considering each mobile device users, will undeniably increase 
the cost in hardware requirements. This observation now questions us about ecological 
issues related to the growth of the number of brand new data centers everywhere in the 
world. 
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CHAPTER III 
A TEXT-INDEPENDANT SPEAKER AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM FOR 
MOBILE DEVICES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Speaker authentication systems may be designed according to two leading 
methods: text-dependent and text-independent (Doddington et al. 2000; Gold et al. 
2011). A text-dependent authentication requires the user to pronounce a predefined 
passphrase that is considered as a voice password. It is used both for the enrollment 
and the identification process. For instance, Google recently introduced the trusted 
voice feature on Android, where users have to enroll their voice by pronouncing “Ok 
Google” three times. Then, this passphrase must be repeated each time the mobile de-
vice needs to be accessed. By contrast, text-independent schemes are able to identify 
the user accurately, for any delivered word or locution that it is impossible to recover 
afterwards. 
Since we have stated, in the previous section, that the previously proposed au-
thentication mechanisms involve lots of interaction with users, this research leans to-
ward a user-centered design. Since we have mentioned the ability to authenticate users 
in a continuous manner with voice-based authentication, our choice was based on a 
speaker authentication system. Moreover, existing speaker authentication techniques 
offered on mobile devices, always require network communications. Indeed, matching 
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templates are usually stored in the cloud. In that sense, they may represent costly au-
thentication solutions for certain users. However, since no additional sensors are 
needed, they remain inexpensive solutions to authenticate users as regards hardware 
requirements. Furthermore, such approaches offer a sufficient acceptance rate with 
end-users and remain less intrusive than fingerprint or retina scan (Clarke et al. 2002; 
Jain et al. 2006a). Hence, these mechanisms may play a major role in some real-world 
applications to secure identity management systems such as e-commerce solutions, at-
tendance systems, mobile banking or forensics. 
It is known that several proposed speaker recognition and identification systems 
achieve accurate results (Reynolds and Rose 1995; Kumar et al. 2009; Nair and Salam 
2014). Despite the effectiveness of these mechanisms, few of them are presently im-
plemented on mobile devices. Moreover, the considerable amount of users who still do 
not secure the access to their mobile devices (Ben-Asher et al. 2011) reveals a need for 
novel methods, that should take into account the diversity in user profiles and usages. 
This research targets these needs. In that sense, this chapter presents a practical use of 
text-independent speaker authentication system applied to mobile devices. The system 
that we suggest relies on Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients (LPCCs) (Furui 1981; 
O'Shaughnessy 1988) and the Naïve Bayes algorithm (Zhang 2004) for patterns clas-
sification. Since authentication mechanisms usually either grant, or deny the access to 
the whole content of the phone, we further suggest enhancing such a final decision to 
overcome false positive and negative identification that may occur. Therefore, we in-
troduce the notion of access privileges, that enable restricting certain access, based on 
a simple evaluation of the user’s location and the presence of a headset. Moreover, we 
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pay attention to opt for low complexity algorithms since we want to avoid network 
communications and achieve both the training and the identification, on the mobile 
device itself. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 provides an over-
view of related work to proposed speaker identification and verification systems. Fi-
nally, section 3.3 details the suggested system, specifically designed to entirely operate 
on mobile devices. 
3.2 RELATED WORK 
In order to achieve speaker authentication, several techniques have been de-
scribed for years through disparate features extraction techniques and classification al-
gorithms. This section first exposes suggested text-independent speaker identification 
and authentication systems to determine their suitability as regards a usage on mobile 
devices. Finally, we will examine proposed schemes which were explicitly designed to 
operate on mobile devices. 
First of all, Reynolds and Rose (1995) have proposed a text-independent 
speaker identification which exploits Mel-Frequency Cepstral1 Coefficients (MFCCs) 
as features and a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) to predict which person is speaking. 
MFCCs are widely used in speaker recognition as they accurately represent the enve-
lope of the short-time power spectrum of the signal. Although such coefficients appear 
to be more robust against noisy conditions, their acquisition remains theoretically very 
                                                 
1 The cepstrum is defined as the inverse DFT of the logarithm of the estimated spectrum of a signal. 
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expensive (Rabiner and Juang 1993). The main motivation of using a GMM was based 
on an empirical observation that a large number of unlabeled classes of sample distri-
bution, may be represented as a linear combination of Gaussian basis functions. To 
evaluate the system, a subset of the KING speech database (Godfrey et al. 1994) was 
used. This database provides utterances from speaker conversations over both signal-
to-noise radio channels and narrowband telephone channels. An accuracy of 80.8% 
was obtained for 49 telephone speech samples of 15 seconds. Besides, authors claimed 
that this model is computationally inexpensive and easy to implement on real-time plat-
forms. However, the main drawback of such a system lies in the initialization of the 
training procedure, where parameters such as mean, covariance and prior of each dis-
tribution have to fit the data. Indeed, such a process may be achieved through several 
costly methods like a Hidden Markov Model (HMM), or a binary k-means clustering 
algorithm. 
Secondly, Kumar et al. (2009) have suggested another text-independent speaker 
identification approach which aims at predicting utterances thanks to a backpropaga-
tion neural network, where LPCs (Linear Prediction Coefficients) parameters were 
used as input features. The goal of the backpropagation method is to optimize weights 
between each neuron layers so that, the neural network can learn how to correctly map 
arbitrary inputs to outputs. Hence, outcomes provide the resulting decision in deter-
mining at which speaker corresponds each given utterance. The evaluation of the sys-
tem was performed over a collection of 25 speech samples in different languages. An 
overall accuracy measure of 85.74% was achieved. This led authors to state that such 
a technique remains appropriate and reliable. However, the theoretical complexity of a 
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standard back-propagation neural network training phase is 𝑂(𝑛𝑚ℎ𝑘𝑜𝑖), where 𝑛 are 
training samples, 𝑚 refers to features, 𝑘 are hidden layers, each containing ℎ neurons, 
𝑜 refers to output neurons and 𝑖 is the number of iterations (LeCun et al. 2012). Hence, 
such a computation time remains overly expensive in a mobile device context. 
On the other hand, concerning speaker authentication, Nair and Salam (2014) 
have proposed a text-independent system which exploits both LPCs and LPCCs to 
compare their strength. The decision was made through the Dynamic Time Warping 
(DTW) algorithm. DTW allows calculating the distance between two given sequences 
which provides the optimal match. Authors have experimented their system over the 
TIMIT speech corpus which provides 630 real speech signals of American English 
speakers. An overall accuracy of 92.2% was obtained with LPCs features while it rose 
up to 97.3% with the derivative cepstral coefficients. Thus, combining LPCCs with the 
DTW algorithm involves an accurate and reliable solution to authenticate users by their 
voice. Since DTW requires a quadratic time and space complexity (Salvador and Chan 
2007), it may not be the most suitable method to achieve speaker authentication, di-
rectly on the mobile device. Nevertheless, real speaker authentication scenarios usually 
imply few distinct samples. In that sense, DTW as decision-making still stays an ac-
ceptable choice for such an authentication mechanism on limited-performance devices. 
According to literature, it appears that few text-independent speaker authenti-
cation solutions for mobile devices were applied in practice. For instance, Vuppala et 
al. (2010) have suggested a recognition model which lies in several speech enhance-
ments to improve the overall performance faced with different noisy conditions. In that 
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sense, authors aimed to prove the robustness of the method when used in varying back-
ground environments. However, their evaluation was performed through noise simula-
tions over speech samples from the TIMIT corpus. Hence, the efficiency of such a 
method with real life noises in the background, may considerably decrease. 
Conversely, Brunet et al. (2013) have introduced a practical text-independent 
speaker authentication system which is entirely usable on mobile devices. The ap-
proach suggests extracting MFCCs features from speech samples. Then, a reference 
model is built thanks to a Vector Quantization (VQ) method. The Euclidean distance 
between stored centroids and testing samples is calculated and compared to a given 
threshold in order to accept or reject the attempt. Authors have performed an experi-
ment over their own database, where training and testing samples were collected thanks 
to a mobile device, as well as the Sphinx database which contains 16 American English 
speakers’ utterances. Since the method was implemented as a stand-alone biometric 
system, only the equal error rate was computed to evaluate the performance. Hence, 
they obtained better performances on their database (4.52 of EER at best), than the ones 
on the public database (5.35 of EER at best). However, achieved results largely rely on 
initial parameters required for the quantization step (i.e. the number of centroids) that 
must be optimized according to the training data. 
With this brief review, it appears that few text-independent authentications that 
focus on mobile device computation capabilities and generic usages were proposed. 
Hence, this chapter introduces a novel text-independent speaker authentication system 
  
54 
for mobile devices, where a special attention was paid to low-computational cost algo-
rithms and any parameter to optimize with expensive techniques as regards processing 
time. 
3.3 PROPOSED SYSTEM 
The proposed system is a text independent speaker authentication mechanism 
for mobile devices. This method works as stand-alone and does not require any costly 
architectures such as client/server. Hence, the entire computation is done end-to-end 
on the mobile device. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, this mechanism consists of three 
main processes. The first one involves extracting individual voice features from a raw 
audio input to build a data set. The following operation lies in training such data with 
a Naïve Bayes classifier. The last process is the authentication decision. It aims at en-
hancing the conventional speaker verification mechanism. To achieve this, we suggest 
granting a specific access privilege to the user of the mobile device through the evalu-
ation of two different states. The first one concerns the current location of the user that 
is compared to the ones defined beforehand. Secondly, we evaluate the presence of a 
headset, that is, whether if it is plugged in the mobile device or not. 
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FIGURE 3.1: FLOWCHART OF OUR PROPOSED SPEAKER AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM 
 
3.3.1 INPUT 
Audio files are recorded using a 16-bit signed integer PCM (Pulse-Code Mod-
ulation) encoding format in bi-channels. The sampling rate of such audio files is up to 
44.1 kHz. 
3.3.2 PREPROCESSING 
Silence Removal 
Given an audio record as input, the first step that we produce is a preprocessing 
phase that aims at removing every silence area only to keep speech segments. First, we 
have defined a threshold close to zero (i.e. 0.0001). Then, our main focus in such a 
preprocessing step is to identify which section of the input signal is close to this thresh-
old in order to remove it. To achieve this, we apply the autocorrelation function 𝑟𝑥(𝑡, 𝑘) 
suggested by Sadjadi and Hansen (2013) onto a windowed audio segment 𝑠𝑤(𝑛) of the 
entire input signal 𝑠(𝑛) as follows, 
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 𝑟𝑥(𝑡, 𝑘) =
∑ 𝑠𝑤(𝑛)𝑤(𝑛)𝑠𝑤(𝑛 + 𝑘)𝑤(𝑛 + 𝑘)
𝑁𝑤−1
𝑛=0
∑ 𝑤(𝑛)𝑤(𝑛 + 𝑘)
𝑁𝑤−1
𝑛=0
, (3.1) 
 
where 𝑡 and 𝑘 are frame and autocorrelation lag indices, respectively, and 𝑤(𝑛) is a 
Hamming window given by, 
 
 𝑤(𝑛) = {
0.54 − 0.46 cos (
2𝜋𝑛
𝑁𝑤 − 1
) ,  0 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁𝑤 − 1
0,                                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.         
, (3.2) 
 
where its length (𝑁𝑤) is based on the frequency of the signal. For each processed seg-
ment 𝑆𝑤(𝑛), if the mean value of the computed coefficients, resulting from the auto-
correlation function, gets close to the defined threshold then, it is identified as a silence 
area and we finally remove it. Figure 3.2. graphically illustrates this process. 
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Silence Areas
  
FIGURE 3.2: THE FIRST SIGNAL IS THE RAW INPUT WHERE SILENCE AREAS ARE 
HIGHLIGHTED. THE SECOND IS THE OUTPUT OF THE SAME SIGNAL AFTER THE SILENCE 
REMOVAL PROCESS 
Audio Normalization 
Succeeding the silence removal phase, a peak normalization is performed. The 
goal is to change the gain of the input to the highest peak of the signal, uniformly. 
Traditionally, this process is used to ensure that the highest peak remains at 0 dBFS 
(deciBels relative to Full Scale)—the loudest level allowed in a digital system. Since 
the entire signal is adjusted, it is indistinguishable and does not affect the original in-
formation. Moreover, the process of normalization ensures that the audio will not clip 
in any manner. Figure 3.3 shows the graphical result of such a process. 
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FIGURE 3.3: THE LEFT SIGNAL IS THE INPUT SIGNAL AND THE RIGHT ONE IS THE SAME 
SIGNAL WITH PEAK NORMALIZATION, WHERE THE SAME SEQUENCE IS HIGHLIGHTED ON 
BOTH SIGNALS 
 
3.3.3 FEATURE EXTRACTION 
Since the voice is considered as a signal containing a lot of information about 
the speaker—the process of extracting several discriminative features from the speech 
remains a critical part of both speaker identification and authentication systems. In that 
sense, we decide to favor the use of the Linear Prediction Cepstral Coefficients 
(LPCCs). Such coefficients are directly derived from the Linear Prediction analysis 
that aims at estimating the relevant features or characteristics from a speech signal 
(Benesty et al. 2007). We justify such a choice by its ability to provide extremely ac-
curate estimates of the speech parameters, and by its relative speed of computation 
(Rabiner and Juang 1993). This last point was a crucial criterion since mobile devices 
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presently remain less powerful than traditional desktop computers. Figure 3.4 graph-
ically summarizes the steps of the features extraction from a preprocessed signal to the 
resulting data set containing voice features. 
Hamming window
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audio signal
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FIGURE 3.4: FLOWCHART OF FEATURES EXTRACTION PROCESS 
To compute the LP analysis, we have implemented the Linear Predictive Cod-
ing algorithm. It was designed to exploit the redundancy present in the speech signal 
by assuming that each sample may be approximated by a linear sum of the past speech 
samples (𝑝). Hence, the predicted sample 𝑆𝑝(𝑛) may be represented as, 
 
 𝑆𝑝(𝑛) =  ∑ 𝑎𝑘𝑠(𝑛 − 𝑘)
𝑝
𝑘=1
, (3.3) 
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where 𝑎(𝑘) are the Linear Prediction Coefficients (LPCs), 𝑠(𝑛 − 𝑘) are past outputs 
and 𝑝 is the prediction order. In our case, the speech signal is multiplied by an over-
lapped Hamming window of 25ms to get a windowed speech segment 𝑆𝑤(𝑛) as, 
 
 𝑠𝑤(𝑛) = 𝑤(𝑛)𝑠(𝑛), (3.4) 
 
where 𝑤(𝑛) is the windowing sequence given in equation (3.2). The error between the 
actual sample and the predicted one 𝑒(𝑛) may be expressed as, 
 
 𝑒(𝑛) = 𝑠𝑤(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑎𝑘𝑠𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑘)
𝑝
𝑘=1
. (3.5) 
 
The main objective of the LP analysis is to compute the LP Coefficients that minimize 
this prediction error. To this end, our system exploits the autocorrelation method that 
is usually preferred since it is computationally more efficient and more stable than the 
covariance one (Al-Hassani and Kadhim 2012). Thus, the total prediction error 𝐸 is 
given as, 
 
 𝐸 =  ∑ 𝑒2(𝑛) = ∑ (𝑠𝑤(𝑛) − ∑ 𝑎𝑘𝑠𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑘)
𝑝
𝑘=1
)
2∞
𝑛=−∞
∞
𝑛=−∞
, (3.6) 
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values of 𝑎(𝑘) that minimize this total prediction error may be computed by finding, 
 
 
𝛿𝐸
𝛿𝑎𝑘
= 0,       1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑝, (3.7) 
 
thus, each 𝑎𝑘 gives 𝑝 equations with 𝑝 unknown variables. The equation (3.8) offers 
the solution to find LP Coefficients, 
 
 ∑ 𝑠𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑠𝑤(𝑛)
∞
𝑛=−∞
= ∑ 𝑎(𝑘)
𝑝
𝑘=1
∑ 𝑠𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝑠𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑘),
∞
𝑛=−∞
     1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑝. (3.8) 
 
Consequently, it is possible to express the linear equation (3.8) in terms of the autocor-
relation function 𝑅(𝑖) as follows, 
 
 𝑅(𝑖) =  ∑ 𝑠𝑤(𝑛)𝑠𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑖), 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑝
𝑁𝑤
𝑛=𝑖
, (3.9) 
 
where 𝑁𝑤 is the length of the window. Then, by substituting values from equation (3.9) 
in the equation (3.8) with the autocorrelation function 𝑅(𝑖) = 𝑅(−𝑖) we obtain the 
following equation, 
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 ∑ 𝑅(|𝑖 − 𝑘|)𝑎𝑘 = 𝑅(𝑖), 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑝
𝑝
𝑘=1
. (3.10) 
 
The set of linear equations is expressed by the relation 𝑅𝑎 = 𝑟 and may be rep-
resented in a matrix form as, 
 
 
𝑅  𝑎  𝑟 
[
𝑅(0) 𝑅(1) ⋯ 𝑅(𝑝 − 1)
𝑅(1) 𝑅(0) ⋯ 𝑅(𝑝 − 2)
⋮
𝑅(𝑝 − 1)
⋮
𝑅(𝑝 − 2)
⋱
⋯
⋮
    𝑅(0)   
] [
𝑎1
𝑎2
⋮
𝑎𝑝
] = [
𝑅(1)
𝑅(2)
⋮
𝑅(𝑝)
], 
(3.11) 
 
where 𝑎 is the vector of LP coefficients and 𝑟 is the autocorrelation. The resulting ma-
trix is a Toeplitz matrix where all elements along a given diagonal are equal. For ex-
ample, with 𝑝 = 3, we get,  
 
 
𝑅  𝑎  𝑟 
[
𝑅(0) 𝑅(1) 𝑅(2)
𝑅(1) 𝑅(0) 𝑅(1)
𝑅(2) 𝑅(1) 𝑅(0)
] [
𝑎1
𝑎2
𝑎3
] = [
𝑅(1)
𝑅(2)
𝑅(3)
]. 
(3.12) 
 
Towards the computation of the LP Coefficient 𝑎𝑘, it is possible to derive 
cepstral coefficients 𝑐𝑛 directly through the following relationship, 
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 𝑐𝑛 = ∑ 𝑎𝑘𝑐𝑛−𝑘 + 𝑎𝑛, 1 < 𝑛 ≤ 𝑝
𝑛−1
𝑘=1
 . (3.13) 
 
where 𝑝 refers to the prediction order. 
It is known that speaker recognition requires more cepstral coefficients than speech 
recognition which employs around 15 of them. Although it was pointed out that in-
creasing the number of such coefficients does not affect the recognition (Kinnunen 
2003), we suggest using 20 LPCCs to preserve a relatively good computation speed. 
3.3.4 CLASSIFICATION 
Several classification algorithms were employed for speaker recognition (i.e. 
GMM, ANN). However, it is known that the Naïve Bayes classifier is fast, very effec-
tive and easy to implement. As a supervised and statistical learning method for classi-
fication—it simply computes the conditional probabilities of the different classes given 
the value of attributes. Finally, it selects the class with the highest conditional proba-
bility. Accordingly, Table 3.1 exposes the theoretical time and space complexity eval-
uations of the Naïve Bayes classifier (John and Langley 1995). 
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TABLE 3.1: NAÏVE BAYES TIME AND SPACE COMPLEXITIES, GIVEN K FEATURES FOR BOTH 
TRAINING AND TESTING OPERATIONS 
OPERATIONS TIME SPACE 
TRAINING ON 𝒏 SAMPLES 𝑂(𝑛𝑘) 𝑂(𝑘) 
TESTING ON 𝒎 SAMPLES 𝑂(𝑚𝑘) Θ(1) 
 
Once the feature extraction process is completed, a set of samples denoted 
𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑖 with their associated class labels 𝑐𝑠1 , 𝑐𝑠2 , … , 𝑐𝑠𝑖 , where 𝑐𝑠𝑖 ∈ Ω =
{𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑗} is obtained. Each sample has 𝑘 features (i.e. LPCCs) represented by float-
ing numbers (with 𝑘 = 20), that are denoted as 𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛. The objective of the Na-
ïve Bayes classifier is to exploit these samples to build a model (i.e. the training phase) 
that will be reused to predict the label of the class 𝑐𝑝 for any future sample (i.e. the 
identification phase). Figure 3.5 shows a simplified block diagram of this process. 
Trained model
Naïve Bayes
classifier
Training
Predicted 
voice sample
Identification decision
Features extraction
 
FIGURE 3.5: FLOWCHART OF THE CLASSIFICATION PROCESS 
The algorithm, strongly relies on the Bayes theorem and imposes two assump-
tions. Firstly, all features 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛 should be independent for a given class 𝑐. This is 
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the class-conditional independence. Secondly, all features 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛 should be directly 
dependent on their assigned class 𝑐. Given that, it is possible to describe the classifier 
as, 
 
 𝑃(𝑐|𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) =
𝑃(𝑐) ∏ 𝑃(𝑎𝑖|𝑐)
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑃(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛)
. (3.14) 
 
Since 𝑝(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛) is common for a certain sample, it may be ignored in the 
classification process. As a result, we can derive equation (3.14) to predict the class 𝑐 
of a given sample during the identification phase as follows, 
 
 𝑐 = argmax
𝑐∈Ω
𝑃(𝑐) ∏ 𝑃(𝑎𝑖|𝑐)
𝑛
𝑖=1
. (3.15) 
 
However, as we obtain the LP coefficients through an autocorrelation method, 
resulting LPCCs remain strongly dependent and consequently, violate the independ-
ence assumption of the Naïve Bayes classifier. Nevertheless, Zhang (2004) has demon-
strated that such a condition is not necessary to satisfy in reality. Indeed, no matter how 
strong dependencies among attributes are, Naïve Bayes can still be optimal if they are 
distributed evenly in class, or if they cancel each other out. Moreover, we have ob-
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served that the distribution of our features, for all classes, when compared to their fre-
quency, follows a normal distribution. Hence, it is possible to assume a valuable clas-
sification rate with Naïve Bayes according to the supposed quality of the LPCCs. 
Here, we propose a simple concrete example of the Naïve Bayes classification 
algorithm. We describe the context as follows. You are talking online with someone 
called Alex you do not know and you want to determine if Alex is a male or a female, 
without asking him/her directly. First, we assume that there are two classes, 𝑐1 = 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 
and 𝑐2 = 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 and that we have a training model with names and sex given by Table 
3.2. 
TABLE 3.2: TRANING MODEL OF THE CONCRET EXAMPLE OF THE NAÏVE BAYES 
CLASSIFIER 
NAME SEX NAME SEX 
Alex Male Matthew Male 
Emily Female Sarah Female 
Alex Female Alyssa Female 
Alex Female Ethan Male 
 
Then, we can use this model to apply the Bayes rule given in equation (3.14) as follows,  
 
 
𝑃(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒|𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥) =
𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥|𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) × 𝑃(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)
𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥)
=  
1
3⁄ ×
3
8⁄
3
8⁄
=  
0.125
3
8⁄
 
𝑃(𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒|𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥) =
𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥|𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒) × 𝑃(𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)
𝑃(𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥)
=  
2
5⁄ ×
5
8⁄
3
8⁄
=  
0.250
3
8⁄
 
(3.16) 
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Since the probability of being named Alex is the same for all the two classes, it is 
actually irrelevant in this example. Hence, seeing as  𝑃(𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒|𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥) = 0.250 > 
𝑃(𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒|𝐴𝑙𝑒𝑥) = 0.125, Alex that we are chatting with, is a woman according to our Naïve 
Bayes classification.  
3.3.5 DECISION-MAKING 
The result provided by the classification task may return two kinds of errors. 
On the one hand, a false-negative outcome refers to a failure in a genuine authentica-
tion, while a false-positive result concerns an impostor attempt mistakenly identified. 
According to authentication on mobile devices, false-negative does not compromise 
the security of the private content. However, it may be disturbing for the user since 
either the process has to be repeated, or a fallback mechanism has to be used. In con-
trast, false-positive exhibits a serious vulnerability for the security of such devices since 
the objective is to avoid fraudulent accesses. Besides, speaker authentication systems 
are not devoid of other drawbacks that may also lead to security threats. Indeed, they 
remain vulnerable to voice mimicry or mock authentication through legitimate voice 
records. 
Hence, we suggest improving the authentication process by introducing the no-
tion of access privileges in order to ward against misidentification. Firstly, we assume 
that users have assigned a right for each application installed on their mobile device 
beforehand. Therefore, we define three privileges as follows. The public privilege al-
lows the access to only non-critical content and applications. The protected privilege 
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restricts the access to the most critical pieces of data (i.e. bank account). Finally, the 
private privilege gives the access to the entire content of the mobile device. 
The process of determining the safest authority to grant that we suggest begins 
by verifying the result produced by the identification process. If the voice does not 
match with a genuine one then, the system allows the user to have a public access. In 
case of false-negative, the user has to repeat the entire process otherwise, an impostor 
identification is avoided. If a match does exist, a protected access is granted and the 
current location is fetched. In that case, the system verifies that the position is inside a 
given radius between 200 and 500 meters of one trusted location—where trusted loca-
tions refer to a predefined set of places connected with the user (i.e. home, work). This 
verification allows us to be quite more robust against fraudulent authentication at-
tempts. However, a risk still exists, especially when we are facing users living together 
such as a family or roommates who obviously share at least, one same location. Hence, 
to reduce chances for a user to be unwillingly authenticated on his own device, we offer 
to proceed another verification. Indeed, we suggest that the private access level must 
only be allowed when the authentication process is achieved while using a headset and 
all previous verification are satisfied. Therefore, we both verify that the headset is 
plugged into the output of the device and that it provides an extra microphone to bypass 
the built-in one. Thus, we judge that it represents an additional level of security when 
there are shared trusted location. In that sense, we assume that false acceptance rates 
must considerably decrease. Figure 3.6 graphically summarize this process. 
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FIGURE 3.6: FLOWCHART OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have proposed a text-independent speaker authentication 
system for mobile devices. This implementation operates as stand-alone which does 
not require any network communications. Indeed, both training and identification 
phases are achieved onto the device itself. 
The first objective in designing such a system was about to take the user into 
account during the authentication process. In that sense, the identification step was en-
hanced thanks to a decision-making that substantially relies on users’ locations and the 
presence of a headset. This improvement in the final decision led us to introduce the 
notion of access privilege that each user has to set up, beforehand, for each application. 
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To this end, users may still perform, in risky situations, several tasks on their devices 
which do not involve more sensitive contents. Consequently, it remains less cumber-
some than several binary biometric authentication schemes such as a fingerprint sys-
tem, and users may be authenticated in a continuous manner. 
Moreover, since an efficient system according to mobile devices computational 
capabilities was desired, a particular attention was paid in the choice of techniques for 
voice features extraction, as well as classification. Hence, a total of 20 LPCCs was 
decided to be extracted from the voice input signal. Then the statistical Naïve Bayes 
classifier was selected to perform the classification process because of fitting input 
features, as well as its linear time complexity. 
  
CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Firstly, in order to assess the accuracy of the proposed text-independent speaker 
authentication system, we suggest an experimental protocol. Hence, to achieve such an 
evaluation, every participant used the system to authenticate himself or herself on a 
provided mobile device, with a headset plugged. Two distinct environmental condi-
tions were exploited in this experiment. The first one was a quiet environment, where 
the training process and a first authentication attempt were completed. Finally, another 
authentication attempt was performed within a noisy environment in order to evaluate 
the robustness of such a mechanism. Consequently, this experiment let us suggest a 
public data set of 11 speakers voice features (i.e. UQAC-Students) as a comparison 
purpose for other researches in the field of speaker authentication. The section 4.2 de-
scribes in detail the experimental protocol we adopted. 
Secondly, section 4.3 exposes and discusses results we obtained further to the 
experiment. Moreover, a comparison with existing data sets was performed in order to 
provide a more complete evaluation of our system. Furthermore, we provide computa-
tion performance, to state about its efficiency and its reliability in running on weakest 
mobile devices present on the market. Finally, the last point of this section exposes 
results from the participants’ survey we supervise. Such an opinion collection let us 
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better understand users’ habits and needs in terms of authentication mechanisms, as 
well as their point of view concerning the usability of our proposed system. 
Finally, section 4.4 closing this chapter by drawing a conclusion which sums 
up the interpretation of obtained results for each evaluation. Then, the section also ex-
poses possible future work concentrations concerning a life-size experiment. 
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL 
4.2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
We recruited 11 university students as participants, 7 males, and 4 females from 
19 to 36 years. All participants were speaking French but some distinct accent, such as 
French Canadian, were observed. Moreover, they were either iOS, or Android users 
and owned at least one recent mobile device (i.e. smartphone or tablet). Furthermore, 
9 of the participants used an unlocking mechanism for their smartphone (PIN: 4, pat-
tern: 2, fingerprint: 3) and fingerprint users either had a PIN code, or a pattern as 
fallback mechanism. 
4.2.2 DATA COLLECTION 
The proposed text-independent system was implemented as an Android appli-
cation which requires at least the 4.0.1 version of the mobile operating system. All 
participants performed the experiment on the same smartphone (i.e. LG Nexus 5 run-
ning Android 6.0.1 with a Snapdragon 800 Quad-core at 2.3 GHz CPU and 2 GB of 
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RAM) with the same headset (i.e. Bose SoundTrue I) in same conditions (i.e. room and 
public place). 
Since it was desired to have real-environment recording conditions, a quiet 
room was selected to achieve the training, as well as the quiet identification session. 
Conversely, the noisy session was performed in the cafeteria of the University. The 
sound level of each distinct place was measured thanks to a sound level meter embed-
ded in the application. The mean value evaluated reached 16.5 dB in the quiet environ-
ment while 95 dB was observed in the noisy one. 
4.2.3 PROCEDURE 
In the beginning, participants were introduced to the experimental procedure 
and the current position was added to the trusted location list. 
Then, training participant voices was the first phase of the experiment. To com-
plete such an operation, a text was randomly selected in a database and displayed on 
the screen of the device. Participants were instructed to wear the headset and to famil-
iarize with the content. Once they were ready, participants were advised to start the 
recording by themselves and next, to begin reading the text aloud. The record was au-
tomatically stopped after one minute by the application and participants were warned 
through both a vibration and a text-to-speech synthesis system. At that point, partici-
pants were asked to wait until the end of the computation. In the meantime, the main 
recorded file was split into 12 seconds chunks, being five instances per class in total. 
Each set of features from each instance were written in the data set which was used to 
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create the training model of the Naïve Bayes classifier, as described previously. Finally, 
participants were advised of the completion of the process thanks to a pop-up message. 
At the end of the training process, the authentication process starts. This proce-
dure was performed twice. In the first place, participants were asked to wear the headset 
and to pronounce the locution of their choice in the quiet environment. In the second 
place, they were requested to execute the same task in the noisy environment. Insofar 
as there was no restriction on the locution which had to be said—participants were able 
to use either two different expressions, or the same one for the two authentication ses-
sions. Since every authentication attempts were performed in the same place, our deci-
sion-making has always stated that users stood in a trusted location. Therefore, we have 
mocked a location which was not considered as a trusted one afterwards, in order to 
verify the reliability of our technique. Figure 4.1 summarizes the proceedings of the 
experiment we conducted using a sequence diagram. 
Finally, in the last step of the experiment, participants were sounded out about 
their habits concerning authentication on their own device, as well as their opinion as 
regards the proposed system. 
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FIGURE 4.1: SEQUENCE DIAGRAM OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
4.3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.3.1 SPEECH CORPUSES 
In this research, we have evaluated the performance of our system by exploiting 
two additional speech corpuses for comparison purpose with the data set we suggest. 
The first one is the Ted-LIUM corpus which has been proposed by Rousseau et 
al. (2014). It includes a total of 1495 audio files extracted from TED talks, where all 
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speeches are English-based with multiple distinct accents. These records are mono-
channel, and they are encoded in 16-bit signed integer PCM at a 16 kHz sampling rate. 
Although the corpus was published using the NIST Sphere format (SPH), we required 
to convert the whole files in Waveform Audio File Format (WAV). Furthermore, we 
took care of removing the first 20 seconds of each file, as they correspond to the talk 
opening sequence. 
The second speech corpus we have exploited in this research, is the Ahu-
mada_25 corpus, which has been suggested by Ortega-Garcia et al. (2000). This is a 
subset of the full database which provides several recording sessions in different con-
ditions, as well as different hardware for 25 Spanish speakers. However, we have only 
exploited recording sessions where a microphone has been used to collect free speech 
talks, being 6 distinct training sets in total. Such provided files are also mono-channel 
and encoded in 16-bit signed integer PCM at a 16 kHz sampling rate. 
4.3.2 CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE METRICS 
Since classification let us predict at which registered speaker corresponds a 
given utterance; it is important to evaluate the performance of our system thanks to 
representative metrics. To this end, the accuracy is probably the most dominant meas-
ure in the literature, because of its simplicity. This measure provides the ratio between 
the correct number of predictions and the total number of cases given as, 
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 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
. (4.1) 
 
where 𝑇𝑃 and 𝑇𝑁 refer to true positive and true negative predictions respectively, and 
the total additionally include false positive (𝐹𝑃) and false negative (𝐹𝑁) predictions. 
Despite its popularity, accuracy alone does typically not provide enough infor-
mation to evaluate the robustness of prediction outcomes. Indeed, accuracy does not 
compensate for results that may be expected by luck. Indeed, a high accuracy does not 
necessarily reflect an indicator of a high classification performance. This is the accu-
racy paradox. For instance, in a predictive classification setting, predictive models with 
a given level of accuracy may have greater predictive power than models with higher 
accuracy. In that sense, as suggested by Ben-David (2007), we decided to provide the 
Cohen’s kappa evaluation metric as well. This measure takes into account such a par-
adox and remains a more relevant metric in multiclass classification evaluations such 
as our system. The kappa measure ∈  [0,1] is given by, 
 
 𝑘 =
𝑃𝑜 − 𝑃𝑒
1 − 𝑃𝑒
. (4.2) 
 
where 𝑃0 and 𝑃𝑒 are observed and the expected probabilities respectively. As an exam-
ple, we suppose that we are classifying data related to a group of 14 people applying 
for a PhD degree admission. Each application is evaluated by two professors (A and 
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B) and they either say “Yes” or “No”. Their opinion was collected and exposed in a 
matrix form as follows,  
 B 
YES NO 
A 
YES a b 
NO c d 
 
In this case, 𝑃𝑜 =
(𝑎+𝑑)
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐+𝑑
=
8+4
14
= 0.857. To obtain the expected probability 𝑃𝑒, we 
first calculate both probabilities of A and B denoted 𝑃𝐴 and 𝑃𝐵 respectively, where 
𝑃𝐴 =
(𝑎+𝑏)×(𝑎+𝑐)
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐+𝑑
=
81
14
 and 𝑃𝐵 =
(𝑐+𝑑)×(𝑏+𝑑)
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐+𝑑
=
25
14
. Thus, the overall expected probabil-
ity is given by, 𝑃𝑒 =
𝑃𝐴+𝑃𝐵
𝑎+𝑏+𝑐+𝑑
= 0.541. Finally, when applying the formula for the Co-
hen’s Kappa we get, 𝑘 =
𝑃𝑜+𝑃𝑒
1−𝑃𝑒
=
0.857−0.541
1−0.541
= 0.688. 
4.3.3 RESULTS OBTAINED 
The performance of our proposed system was evaluated according to several 
analyses. First of all, results of the experiment we described previously are shown in 
Table 4.1. In this evaluation, we have exploited testing instances we obtained over our 
experiment for both quiet and noisy environments. Thanks to such achieved results it 
is possible to observe that our system yields an accurate identification of voices in real-
environmental conditions with our own instances. 
 B 
YES NO 
A 
YES 8 1 
NO 1 4 
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TABLE 4.1: RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT BASED ON THE REALIZED DATA SET: UQAC-
STUDENTS 
 
UQAC-STUDENTS 
 
QUIET ENVIRONMENT NOISY ENVIRONMENT 
KAPPA 0.90 0.80 
ACCURACY 91% 81.82% 
NUMBER OF CLASSES 11 
NUMBER OF INSTANCES 
USED FOR TRAINING 
5 
NUMBER OF INSTANCES 
USED FOR TESTING 
1 1 
 
In order to compare such results, we have constructed related data sets thanks 
to the Ted-LIUM and the Ahumada_25 corpuses. However, since the Ahumada_25 
corpus contains a total of 6 distinct recording sessions of 25 classes, we judged that it 
was a necessity to unify the Ted-LIUM corpus accordingly. In that sense, we have 
created 6 different training sets by selecting 25 samples randomly over the 1494 files. 
Moreover, we have also ensured that a sample was not chosen more than once for a 
given batch. For each corpus, samples of all sessions were split into 7 instances of 12 
seconds. In order to be more consistent with our experimental procedure, the first 5 
instances were used in the training phase; while the last two were exploited for the 
identification. Obtained results over these two data sets are exposed in Figure 4.2. Alt-
hough achieved results on Ted-LIUM data set were valuable (0.94 of kappa at best), 
the ones we got on Ahumada_25 data set were not as much accurate (0.75 of kappa at 
best), but remain promising. Such a change between these two data sets may be related 
to several factors such as the quality of microphones or the language of the speaker that 
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may affect the quality of the input features even if it is a text-independent system 
(Kinnunen and Li 2010). 
 
FIGURE 4.2: ACCURACY AND KAPPA MEASURES ACHIEVED BY OUR SYSTEM OVER THE 6 
DATA SETS OF BOTH TED-LIUM AND AHUMADA CORPUSES 
However, as these evaluations involve a relatively low number of distinct clas-
ses, we point out the analysis of the evolution of the kappa measure when increasing 
the number of classes. The Ted-LIUM corpus let us perform such an appraisal since it 
is the largest corpus we used in this research. Hence, we did not change the number of 
instances that we have exploited in the previous evaluation, 5 instances per class for 
the training and 2 for the identification phase. We chose to compute the kappa by in-
creasing exponentially the number of classes to the total of 1495. Figure 4.3 shows that 
the more there are classes, the more the kappa measure tends to decrease. Indeed, our 
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system obtains a kappa of 0.51 where the entire set of classes was used in the identifi-
cation process. Such a result was expected since we are not facing a binary classifica-
tion problem. 
 
FIGURE 4.3: EVOLUTION OF THE KAPPA MEASURE OVER THE TED-LIUM CORPUS WHEN 
ICREASING EXPONENTIALLY THE NUMBER OF CLASSES 
 
4.3.4 COMPUTATION PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
The primary concern in designing such a system was about building an efficient 
authentication mechanism for mobile devices. 
To this end, we have chosen fitting techniques with attention to time complexity 
and memory consumption. Figure 4.4 exposes a profiling of both CPU and memory 
utilization of the mobile device, over every phase of the experiment we conduct. As a 
result, we reach the highest peak through the training phase, being 45% CPU and 70 
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MB usage. Indeed, since the features extraction relies on a sophisticated series of op-
erations, we parallelized the algorithm by distributing the calculation over the different 
cores provided by the processor to reduce the time complexity. Since we wanted to 
exploit all the available hardware resources, the CPU consumption undoubtedly grows 
but its usage remains largely satisfying.   
Thanks to these measurements, it is possible for us to assess that our system 
remains broadly satisfactory regarding both time and memory consumption when run-
ning on a Nexus 5 Android mobile device. With regards to less efficient mobile devices, 
our system should be subject to further testing to be assessed as effective. Although 
memory consumption should not be a real problem, we expect a slight increase in the 
computation time with less powerful devices.  
 
FIGURE 4.4: CPU AND RAM CONSUMPTION, RESPECTIVELY EXPRESSED IN %CPU AND MB, 
OVER EVERY STEP OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Start Training Testing End
M
B
%
C
P
U
CPU RAM
  
83 
4.3.5 PARTICIPANTS OPINION CONSIDERATIONS 
Here we report the participants’ opinions concerning the proposed system. 
Hence, it aims at better understanding users’ needs and habits as regards authentication 
in order to replace present mechanisms offered on mobile devices. 
This survey shows that 2 of users who enable a knowledge-based authentication 
mechanism (i.e. PIN or pattern), have reported that it is overly repetitive and lead them 
to make mistakes several times a day. Besides, every fingerprint user has mentioned a 
bothering malfunction with finger moisture. As a result, 3 participants over the 9 who 
lock their device, as well as 1 over the two participants who do not employ such secu-
rity, would use this system as a replacement of their present authentication scheme 
because of its simplicity. Moreover, 8 respondents have mentioned they could place 
their confidence in the described system. However, remaining participants have de-
clared that talking to their mobile device could be annoying in public areas and conse-
quently, they have claimed that they do not trust any voice-based authentication 
scheme. 
This opinion collection now allows us to state that our system could become a 
relevant authentication mechanism for several users. However, an opinion collection 
on a larger population of users should better reflect such observation. In addition, since 
it is text-independent, such a system is able to perform the authentication in a continu-
ous manner, without any involvement from the user. In that sense, anxieties, as regards 
the discomfort in talking to a device in public places which were reported in the survey, 
may be reduced to void. Therefore, we esteem that such a technique may be a more 
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significant option as part of a multilayer authentication. Moreover, it should also be 
better employed as a more reliable fallback solution in order to eradicate PIN codes. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
Results we have obtained over the different analysis we performed, suggest that 
our proposed system embodies an accurate and reliable authentication in both quiet and 
noisy environments, with a plugged headset (i.e. 0.90 and 0.80 of kappa in quiet and 
noisy environments, respectively) for the 11 French people involved in the experimen-
tation. Besides, computation performance outcomes demonstrate that this mechanism 
is also an efficient way to authenticate users since we have observed encouraging re-
sults in its ability to run on weakest mobile devices. However, further experimentations 
with less powerful devices are required to prove such an observation. 
We found that 7 users were still not ready to switch from their present authen-
tication mechanism. Moreover, 27% of the participants have reported that they could 
not place their confidence in such a system, as it may be disturbing when used in public 
places. However, since it is text-independent, legitimate users may be implicitly au-
thenticated as they start speaking, insofar as the mobile device is neither in their pocket, 
nor their bag (i.e. during a conversation). In that sense, we suggest that this technique 
should be either used in a multilayer authentication system, or as a fallback mechanism, 
namely when the first one fails, to cover most of users’ needs and usages. 
Future works will focus on offering the application on the Google Play Store to 
better assess the accuracy and the robustness of the proposed authentication system. 
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However, the current implementation will be adapted in order to let us track user au-
thentication attempt outcomes and locations. In this way, such a large-scale evaluation 
will provide more reliable results in front of real life condition usages and the location-
based decision will be better exploited and significant, as it was in the experiment we 
have conducted in this research. 
  
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Over the past few years, several authentication mechanisms were proposed. 
These systems may be divided into three broad categories: knowledge-based, token-
based and biometric authentications. However, the taxonomy presented in chapter 2 
led us to maintain that existing authentication systems concede several advantages and 
drawbacks. Moreover, we pointed out that most of these schemes were designed to a 
machine point of view. Consequently, users have adopted wrong behaviors which lead 
to important security threats and weaknesses. 
Given that, the first effort of this research project was to introduce several eval-
uation criteria based on strengths and weaknesses which were underlined in our review. 
These criteria allowed us to evaluate each authentication systems to understand their 
pros and their cons as regards users’ considerations and usability. Then, by way of 
conclusion, we proposed an appraisal lean toward the aftermath of authentication on 
mobile devices that head for new perspectives concerning no password and ubiquitous 
authentication mechanisms. 
As stated in chapter 3, speaker authentication systems remain an inexpensive 
solution to authenticate users. Indeed, no additional sensors are required and these 
mechanisms may play a major role in some real-world applications to secure identity 
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management systems such as e-commerce solutions, attendance systems, mobile bank-
ing or forensics. However, we showed that few speaker authentication systems are 
presently implemented on mobile devices. 
Accordingly, the second concern of this research was to suggest a practical im-
plementation of a text-independent speaker authentication mechanism for mobile de-
vices. Our main concentrations in designing such a system were about both its effi-
ciency in terms of computational requirements, as well as its accuracy in authenticating 
users. To this end, the chapter 3 introduced the proposed authentication mechanism. It 
is based on the extraction of LPCCs to obtain relevant voice features, as well as the 
Naïve Bayes classifier to predict at which speaker a given utterance corresponds. More-
over, the authentication decision was enhanced through the affectation of a given ac-
cess privilege (i.e. public, protected or private), for each authentication attempt. Such 
an authority is granted through the analysis of the user’s location and the presence of a 
headset. 
The chapter 4, allowed us to state that the proposed system entirely responds to 
research problems formulated in chapter 1. Indeed, we first evaluated its accuracy 
through an experiment we conducted over eleven participants’ voice samples, in dif-
ferent sort of environments (i.e. quiet and noisy). Although the results we obtained on 
our data set are accurate, we also experienced the system with other existing data sets 
(i.e. Ted-LIUM and Ahumada_25). Over again, results remained similarly accurate on 
the Ted-LIUM dataset and stayed relevant when increasing the number of classes to 
predict. However, we observed a minor drop of accuracy with Ahumada_25 samples 
which may be mainly due to their initial recording quality. 
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Finally, as personal assessment, I would say that this research project was a 
rewarding experience as a first step into the world of research. I was able to successfully 
conduct this project because of its interesting characteristics and all the knowledge I 
could acquire in working on it. I particularly collect strong knowledge in the field of 
machine learning and signal processing. Moreover, this experience allowed me to de-
velop other important new skills such as a rigorous research methodology, solid writing 
skills in English, as well as communication skills. This project also let me produce two 
scientific publications, where the first one is accepted (Thullier et al. 2016) and the 
second one is, for now on, submitted to a scientific journal about Information Security. 
Finally, such a positive experience pushes me to pursuing doctoral studies, since I want 
to challenge myself even further. 
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